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Case No. 20020885-SC 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(i) 
(2002), where Appellant Rehan Hassan was convicted of two counts of aggravated 
burglary, lst° felony offenses under Utah Code Ann. 76-6-203 (1999); and three counts 
of simple assault, class B misdemeanors under Utah Code Ann. 76-5-102 (1999). The 
original judgments were entered in the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, the Honorable Anne M. Stirba presiding. Those judgments are 
attached as Addendum A. On June 6, 2003, the trial court resentenced Hassan pursuant 
to this Court's Order of April 21, 2003. The June 6, 2003 judgments, entered by the 
Honorable Michael K. Burton, are attached as Addendum B. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
The Issues: First, whether the trial court failed to obtain a knowing and voluntary 
waiver of the right to a jury trial, where the court failed to inform Hassan prior to 
obtaining the waiver that he had the right to be tried by an impartial jury. Second, 
whether Hassan was denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel in connection 
with hearings on the new trial motion. 
Standard of Review: Both issues concern the waiver of important constitutional 
rights. Whether a waiver is made "knowingly and intelligently is a mixed question of 
law and fact. We review the trial court's legal determinations for correctness." State v. 
Heaton. 958 P.2d 911, 914 (Utah 1998); see also State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 935-36 
(Utah 1994). 
PRESERVATION OF ARGUMENT 
The issues were not preserved in the record. Hassan has raised them under the 
plain-error doctrine (State v. Saunders. 1999 UT 59, |30, 992 P.2d 951; State v. Labrum. 
925 P.2d 937, 940-41 (Utah 1996)), and the manifest-injustice doctrine (State v. Casey . 
2003 UT 33, 2003 Utah Lexis 88; State v. Hasten. 846 P.2d 1276 (Utah 1993)). 
RULES. STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The following provisions will be determinative of the issues on appeal and are 
included in Addendum C: Utah Code Ann. § 77-1-6 (1999); Utah R. Crim. P. 17, 20, and 
30(a) (2003); Utah Const, art. I, § 12; and U.S. Const, amend. VI. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case; Course of the Proceedings; Disposition in the Court Below . 
In 1999 the state charged Hassan in two separate cases (Case No. 991911407 
("Case 11407") and Case No. 991915044 ("Case 15044")) with several counts of aggra-
vated burglary and assault. (Case 11407:2-5 (charging two counts of aggravated 
2 
burglary and three counts of assault); Case 15044:2-3 (charging one count of aggravated 
burglary).) I 'I le cl lai ges ii 1 Case 11 10' 7 related to coi ldi ict that allegedly occurred ,riy 
29, 1999, and June 3, 1999 (se^ Case 11407:2-5); and the charge in Case 15044 related 
to conduct that allegedly occurred on May 29, 1999. (Case 15044:2-3.) 
After a preliminary hearing in each case, the lower court bound Hassan over on 
the charges. (Case 11407:12-13; Case 15044:54; R. 445.) On I<ebniar> 14, 2000, the 
court ordered that Case 15044 and Case 11407 be consolidated. (R. 203:4.)1 
On May 15, 2000, the parties tried the case to the bench. (Case 15044:120-121; 
Case 11407:94-95.) On May 16, 2000, the trial court reached a verdict, finding Hassan 
guilty on two counts of aggravated burglary and three as of assault. (Case 
15044:122-23; Case 11407:99-100.) A copy of the court's "Findings of Fact, Conclu-
sions of Law, and Order of Conviction" for Case 15044 is attached as Addendum D. 
(Case 15044:127-133; see also Case 11407:182-188 (same).) 
On July 7, 2000, Hassan filed a new trial motion. (R. Case 15044:143-44; Case 
11407:202.) On July 18, 2000, the trial court imposed sentence against Hassan and 
entered judgment. (Case 15044:148-49; Case 11407:204-05.) 
On September 17, 2002, the trial court proceeded with an evidentiary hearing on 
the new trial motion. (R. 454.) After the hearing, the court denied the motion and 
1
 After consolidation, the trial court continued to maintain separate files for each case. 
On appeal, Hassan will identify the pleadings from the separate files by referring first to the 
case number, as indicated above, followed by the page number in the file (e.g. Case 
11407:1). Hassan will refer to transcript pages in the usual fashion. For example, the first 
page of the transcript designated as 204 of the record will appear as follows: (R. 204:1). 
3 
Hassan appealed. (Case 11407:419-426; s_ee_ also Case 15044:194-201 (same); Case 
15044:175-76 (notice of appeal).) A copy of the court's "Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law, and Order" in Case 11407 is attached as Addendum E. 
On April 23, 2003, this Court remanded the case to the trial court for re-senten-
cing, in order that Hassan may properly perfect an appeal. (Case 15044:206; Case 
11407:458.) On June 6, 2003, the trial court entered new judgments (Case 15044:213-
14; Case 11407:471-72), and Hassan filed an amended notice of appeal. (Case 15044: 
215; Case 11407:473-74.) The appeal is now properly before this Court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
After a bench trial, the trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
(Case 15044:127-133; Case 11407:182-88 (same).) The court found the following. 
J.D. and Carol Miller lived in an apartment at 550 East 300 South, in Salt Lake 
City. (Case 15044:127.) Hassan lived in the same apartment building, across the hall 
from the Millers. (Case 15044:127.) The Millers were on-site assistant managers for the 
apartment building. (See Case 15044:128.) 
In late May 1999, the power company disconnected power to Hassan's apartment. 
(Case 15044:128.) Hassan ran an electrical cord from the common areas of the building 
to his apartment. (IcL) On May 29, 1999, J.D. Miller unplugged the cord. (Id.) 
When Hassan found the cord unplugged, he became upset. He went to the 
Millers' apartment and confronted Carol. (Case 15044:128.) Hassan and Carol engaged 
in a verbal argument at the door. Carol shut the door and bolted it while Hassan 
4 
continued to stand outside her apartment. (Id.; R. 450:60.) According to Carol, Hassan 
"became upset and kicked at tin outside of the door several times until the door flew 
open." (Case 15044:128.) Carol claimed that Hassan knocked out the deadbolt securing 
the door (R. 450:30, 32), then entered the apartment and told Carol he was going to kill 
her and T D Hassan "grabbed Carol by the arm and threw her to the floor." (Case 
15044:128.) Carol suffered pain tin) a bruise In her arm. (Case 15044 129.) 
After Hassan left, the Millers tried to fix the door/lock and secure the apartment. 
(Case 15044:129.) According to Carol, Hassan returned minutes later, again kicking in 
the door. (R. 450:37, 38.) He walked into the bedroom where Carol was dressing and he 
threatened In kill her. Carol claimed that Hassan "grabbed her ami pushed hot In ilie 
floor." (Case 15044:129.) He then went into the living room, hit J.D. in the face, and 
pulled J.D.'s hair. (Id.) Hassan left, and returned a third time. (Id.) Based on those 
findings, the court found Hassan guilty of two counts of aggravated burglary and two 
counts of assault. (Case 15044:122-23; Case 11407:99-100.) 
The court also found that on June 3, 1999, Kathy Harris and her son were working 
at the apartment building. Kathy is married to the building manager. (Case 15044:129.) 
While Kathy was outside, Carol approached her and told her that Hassan was running an 
extension cord from an outlet in the common areas to his apartment, (id. ) 
Kathy went inside the building and observed the extension cord. Kathy knocked 
on the door to Hassan's apartment, and when he answered she identified herself and told 
Hassan he "could not use the apartmeni In Hiding's power" for his own apartment. (Case 
5 
15044:130.) As Kathy reached down to unplug the extension cord from the outlet in the 
hallway, Hassan "hit Kathy in the mouth, shoved her against the wall across the hall, and 
began to kick her repeatedly." (Case 15044:130.) Based on those findings, the court 
found Hassan guilty of assault. (Case 11407:99-100.) 
Hassan presented evidence at trial that he did not enter the Millers' apartment, he 
did not assault them (R. 450:166-72), and he did not assault Kathy Harris. (R. 450:174-
78.) Counsel for Hassan identified discrepancies in the Millers' testimony to discredit 
their claims. (R. 450:193-211.) Also, the prosecutor admitted that the factual issues in 
this case turned on credibility. (R. 450:187.) The judge found Hassan guilty on five of 
six charges. Additional facts relating to the issues on appeal are set forth below. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
Prior to trial, Hassan informed the court that he would waive the jury. The court 
engaged in a colloquy concerning jury waiver, but failed to advise Hassan that he had the 
constitutional right to be tried by an impartial jury, and/or that he would be allowed to 
participate in the jury selection process to ensure the impaneling of an unbiased jury. In 
this case, that constitutional right should have been communicated to Hassan before the 
court accepted the waiver. Specifically, the record is replete with Hassan's claims of un-
fair and racist treatment by community members due to his nationality and religion. Since 
Hassan did not believe he would receive a fair trial in the community, it was important 
that the court communicate that constitutional rule of law to him before obtaining a 
waiver. Where the trial court failed to inform Hassan of his right to an impartial jury, the 
6 
waiver was not knowing and voluntary. On that basis, the convictions must be reversed. 
Next, Hassan was denied his right to counsel in the evidentiary hearing on the new 
trial moiion wording i • record, after Hassan and varioi is atton \ey s appeal ed 
before the court several times on the new trial motion, Hassan asked the court to let him 
argue the motion himself. Hassan made that request when his appointed attorneys 
demonstrated an unwillingness to proceed or unpreparedness. On those occasions, the 
trial court allowed the attorneys to withdraw and gave Hassai i lin lited oj )tions that did not 
include proceeding with the effective assistance of counsel. Here the record fails to 
support that Hassan's decision to proceed pro se was actually and entirely voluntary. 
In addition, in those instances when the trial court engaged in a colloquy for self-
representation, the court failed to advise Hassan of the dangers/disadvantages of self-
representation in the context of an evidentiary hearing, to ascertain whether Hassan 
understood the technical rules for such a hearing, and to inform Hassan of additional 
facts, including that Hassan had the right to testify in such a hearing and he would be 
precluded on appeal from raising issues that were not raised there. The colloquy was 
deficient. Hassan was entitled to the assistance of counsel in the evidentiary hearing on 
the new trial motion. This case should be remanded for proper proceedings in that regard. 
ARGUMEN' I S 
POINT I. HASSAN DID NOT KNOWINGLY AND VOLUNTARILY 
WAIVE HIS RIGHT TO BE TRIED BY AN IMPARTIAL JURY. 
A. A DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO AN IMPARTIAL JURY. 
"Both the United States Constitution and the Utah Constitiition guarantee an 
7 
accused the right to a fair and impartial jury." State v. Wach, 2001 UT 35, ^ 36, 24 P.3d 
948 (citing Utah Const, art. I, § 12; U.S. Const, amend. VI); s_ee_ Utah Code Ann. § 77-1-
6(1 )(f). "A defendant's only constitutional right concerning the method of trial is to an 
impartial trial by jury." Singer v. U.S.. 380 U.S. 24, 36 (1965); see Saunders, 1999 UT 
59, ^33 (stating an impartial jury is essential to a fair trial). ff[T]he impartiality of the jury 
goes to the very integrity of our justice system, and the right to an impartial jury is so 
essential to our conception of a fair trial that its violation cannot be considered harmless 
error." State v. Bird. 2002 MT 2, [^48, 43 P.3d 266 (cite omitted). 
The constitutional right to an impartial jury is protected under Utah law. For 
example, a defendant has a right to be present during jury voir dire. State v. Hubbard , 
2002 UT 45,1J33 & n.7, 48 P.3d 953 (assuming without deciding that defendant has a 
right to be present at side-bar discussions with potential jurors during jury selection; the 
selection of jurors "arguably has a reasonably substantial relation to the fulness of a 
defendant's opportunity to defend against a charge, and a defendant's right to a fair and 
just hearing could be thwarted by his or her absence"); State v. Wanosik, 2001 UT App 
241,1J14 n.6, 31 P.3d 615 (recognizing that under federal rules, the defendant shall be 
present at the impaneling of the jury), affd, 2003 UT 34, 2003 Utah LEXIS 89. 
Also, to ensure the constitutional right to an unbiased jury, courts have developed 
an array of rules and remedies. See Utah Const, art. I, §12; Utah Code Ann. § 77-1-
6(l)(f); Utah R. Crim. P. 18 (2003) (no person may serve on the jury unless the judge is 
"convinced" the juror will act impartially) and Advisory Committee Notes (focusing on 
8 
the objective of rule 18 and the challenge for cause to "remove from the venire panel 
persons who cannot act impartialI \ in deliberating upon a verdict"; recognizing that 
thorough questioning of a potential juror to determine "the existence, nature and extent 
of a bias is appropriate"; stating that the judge may seat only those jurors who will "act 
fairly and impartially"); Utah R. Crim. P. 29(d) (2003) (allowing for a change of venue if 
a "fair and impartial trial" cannot be had in the jurisdiction); see_ also Utah R. Crim. P. 
11(e)(3) (2003) (providing that before a trial judge may accept a guilty plea, he must 
ascertain that defendant knows of his right to an impartial jury and waives that right). 
B. A DEFENDANT MAY WAIVE HIS RIGHT TO BE TRIED BY A JURY. 
The law allows a person accused of a felony to forego the jury process altogether 
and to proceed with a bench trial. See. State v. Moosman, 794 P.2d 474, 477 (Utah 
1990); Utah R. Crim. P. 17(c) (2003). 
In Patton v. U.S., 281 U.S. 276 (1930), the Supreme Court expressed a preference 
for a trial by jury. Id at 312. It also recognized that a defendant has the pow 11 (o waive 
that right. The provision of the federal constitution ensuring a defendant's right to a jury 
trial "was meant to confer a right upon the accused which he may forego at his election." 
Id. at 298. The Court emphasized that the right to a jury should not be dispensed with 
lightly, and it laid down the principles relevant to waiver. 
Not only must the right of the accused to a trial by a constitutional jury be 
jealously preserved, but the maintenance of the jury as a fact finding body in 
criminal cases is of such importance and has such a place in our traditions, that, 
before any waiver can become effective, the consent of government counsel and 
the sanction of the court must be had, in addition to the express and intelligent 
consent of the defendant. And the duty of the trial court in that regard is not to be 
9 
discharged as a mere matter of rote, but with sound and advised discretion, with 
an eve to avoid unreasonable or undue departures from that mode of trial or from 
any of the essential elements thereof, and with a caution increasing in degree as 
the offenses dealt with increase in gravity. 
Patton, 281 U.S. at 312-13 (emphasis added). The right may be waived only when the 
defendant's decision is voluntary, knowing and intelligent. See id. at 312. 
With respect to constitutional rights applicable to trial proceedings, the Supreme 
Court also has stated the following: 
A strict standard of waiver has been applied to those rights guaranteed to a 
criminal defendant to insure that he will be accorded the greatest possible 
opportunity to utilize every facet of the constitutional model of a fair criminal 
trial. Any trial conducted in derogation of that model leaves open the possibility 
that the trial reached an unfair result precisely because all the protections specified 
in the Constitution were not provided. 
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 241 (1973); see. also id at 235 n.16. 
C. COURTS HAVE DEVELOPED STANDARDS FOR OBTAINING A 
DEFENDANT'S WAIVER OF A JURY TRIAL. 
This Court considered the waiver of a jury trial nearly twenty years ago in State v. 
Garteiz, 688 P.2d 487 (Utah 1984). There, defendant was convicted during a bench trial 
of aggravated robbery, kidnaping, and attempted extortion. IdL_ at 487. He argued on 
appeal that he was unfairly denied a jury trial. Four members of the Court reviewed the 
matter and determined defendant's waiver was adequate under current law. 
The exchange between the defendant and the court consisted of four questions, to 
each of which the defendant answered, a "Yes." The court asked if the defendant 
understood he had the right to a jury, if he wished to waive that right, if he 
understood the court could refuse such a waiver, and if he understood the 
prosecutor had to agree to the waiver. 
Id. at 488-89. The Court affirmed the judgment. Id. (Zimmerman, J., did not participate). 
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In a special concurring opinion, two justices expressed concern over problems 
with current law. Id. at 488 (DUIIKIIII and Howe, JJ.,) Specificalh the defendant Garteiz 
"received no explanation directly from the court about the nature and extent of his right 
to a jury trial." Id at 488. Based on the circumstances, the two justices considered it 
"unlikely" that defendant understood the importance of the rights he had waived. 
It seems unlikely that a defendant in these circumstances would understand 
the implications and the extent of his waiver, namely, that he was giving up the 
right to have eight of his "peers" decide unanimously, beyond a reasonable doubt, 
that he was guilty. 
The courtroom is an inherently intimidating place. Criminal defendants, 
especially those unfamiliar with the English language and courtroom procedure, 
are even more likely to be intimidated than other spectators or trial participants. 
Further, when courts are overcrowded and defendants are with court-appointed 
counsel, the potential is great that economic concerns, time pressures and other 
stresses on the court and counsel may influence a decision that should be made 
carefully, thoughtfully and with the benefit of accurate, objective information 
about the alternatives. 
Id. at 489. The justices suggested "more adequate judicial standards for the waiver of 
jury trials." Id at 488. 
Next, in Moosman, 794 P.2d 474, this Court again considered a defendant's 
waiver of the jury. There, defendant was convicted of murder, communications fraud 
and filing a false insurance claim. Id. at 475. On appeal he argued, inter alia, that he 
was denied his right to a jury. IcL at 475. The record on the issue apparently was incom-
plete, and after remand where the record was supplemented with affidavits from both 
parties, the Court addressed the merits. Id. at 478-79. It stated, "This court places great 
emphasis on the importance of a defendant's understanding the nature and extent of the 
waiver of a jury trial. Ihe issue in this case is primarily whether i waiver was made and 
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secondarily to what extent the waiver was informed and knowledgeable." IdL_ at 477. 
Without articulating standards applicable to the trial court in taking a waiver (see 
Garteiz, 688 P.2d at 489), this Court affirmed the waiver based on the prosecutor's recol-
lection of events and the court's findings that "the judge fully explained defendant's right 
to a jury trial and the implications of a waiver and that defendant personally, voluntarily, 
and knowingly waived his right to a jury trial." Moosman, 794 P.2d at 479. 
In other jurisdictions, courts have articulated a workable standard for determining 
whether a defendant's waiver of his right to a jury is knowing and intelligent. The 
standard considers the following: Whether a defendant is informed that a jury is 
composed of a specific number of community members, that he may participate in the 
selection of the jurors, that the verdict of the jury must be unanimous, and that a judge 
alone will decide guilt or innocence should he waive his jury trial right.2 Such a colloquy 
2
 The colloquy is identified in some instances as the "Delgado" standard. See U.S. v. 
Delgado, 635 F.2d 889, 890 (7th Cir. 1981) (setting guidelines for trial courts to accept jury 
waiver, where the court explains the jury composition, that defendant may participate injury 
selection, that the jury's verdict must be unanimous, and the difference between a jury trial 
and a bench trial); see also U.S. v. Martin. 704 F.2d 267, 273 (6th Cir. 1983); U.S. v. 
Robertson, 45 F.3d 1423, 1432 (10th Cir. 1995) (joining those jurisdictions that assess 
whether the trial court informed the defendant of the composition of a jury, of his 
participation in jury selection, and of the unanimity requirement before accepting a jury 
waiver); Marone v. U.S., 10 F.3d 65, 68 (2d Cir. 1993) (urging courts at a minimum to 
comply with the Delgado standard); Davis v. State, 809 A.2d 565, 572 (Del. 2002) ("At a 
minimum, the trial judge should engage in an exchange with the defendant" explaining the 
composition of the jury, "that the defendant may participate in the selection of jurors, and that 
the verdict of the jury is unanimous"); Statev.O'Donnell 548 N.E.2d 755,757 (111. App. Ct. 
1989) ("Where a defendant is informed of his right to a trial by a jury that will determine his 
guilt or innocence, and of his ability to participate in selecting the jury, he has the minimum 
information necessary to exercise that right or waive it, because that is what the right 
encompasses"); State v. Stallings, 658 N.W.2d 106, 111 (Iowa 2003) (stating that the court 
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ensures a knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver. It has the effect of informing a 
defendant of his constitutional rights "with an eye to avoid unreasonable or undue 
departures from that mode of trial or from any of the essential elements thereof." Patton., 
281 U.S. at 312-13. The standard also recognizes "the importance of a defendant's under-
standing the nature and extent of the waiver of a jury trial " Moosman., 794 P.2d at 477. 
According to Patton, the waiver colloquy is not required to be a technical 
recitation. Patton, 281 U.S. at 312. For example, where the trial court has informed the 
defendant that he may participate in the jury selection process (see. supra note 2, herein) 
and/or t; . •;- '1 supervise and advise tl iejt u y oi i the law and facts, that has the 
effect of conveying an essential principle of the right to an impartial jury trial. 
Finally, the United States Supreme Court has stated the following: 
"[C]ourts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver" of 
fundamental constitutional rights and [they] "do not presume acquiescence in the 
loss of fundamental rights." A waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment 
or abandonment of a known right or privilege. The determination of whether 
there has been an intelligent waiver of the right to counsel must depend, in each 
should inquire into the four areas with defendant before accepting a waiver); State v. Ross, 
472 N.W.2d 651, 654 (Minn. 1991) (commending the Delgado factors to the trial courts); 
Com, v. Greene, 394 A.2d 978 (Pa. 1978) (requiring the court to articulate the elements 
essential to a jury trial (i.e. the composition, impartiality, unanimity) before accepting 
waiver); State v. Ellis, 953 S.W.2d216,222 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997) (relying on Robertson, 
45 F.3d 1423, and advising colloquy); State v. West, 667 A.2d 540, 544-45 (Vt. 1995) 
(mandating the standard for jury waivers); State v. Redden, 487 S.E.2d 318, 326 (W.Va. 
1997) (advising courts to address the four areas with defendant before accepting a waiver). 
Under Kentucky law, "In determining whether a waiver of a jury trial is made 
understandingly, intelligently, competently, and voluntarily, the court must apply the same 
standards that are required on the acceptance of a guilty plea." Short v. Commonwealth, 519 
S.W.2d 828, 833 (Ky. 1975). 
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case, upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including 
the background, experience, and conduct of the accused. 
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938) (notes omitted). Whether there is "an intel-
ligent, competent, self-protecting waiver of [the] jury trial by an accused must depend 
upon the unique circumstances of each case." Adams v. U.S., 317 U.S. 269, 278 (1942). 
D. THE UNIQUE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE SUPPORT THAT THE 
JURY WAIVER WAS NOT VOLUNTARY AND KNOWING. 
The unique facts and circumstances in this case reflect the following. After 
preliminary hearings, the cases were bound over for trial before Judge Stirba. (See Case 
11407:12-13; Case 15044:54.) On January 5, 2000, Judge Stirba received a case report 
from Hassan's wife, Elisabeth Updike. (See. Case 11407:47-69.) In the report, Updike 
described the case as "a history of injustice racism, miscommunication, and 
misunderstanding regarding Rehan Hassan," and she indicated that Hassan was subjected 
to "racism" in the community and in connection with the case. (See Case 11407:50-52.) 
The report referenced Hassan's "Muslim community friends" (icLX his family in Pakistan 
(id. at 50-51), his confusion over what he perceived to be "America's obvious lack of 
justice", and his Islamic religion. (Id. at 51.) 
Also, the report contained "pieces of Rehan's writings," where he claimed the case 
was "of an extreme biased, prejudice] and discrimination." (Case 11407:53.) He 
asserted that he was "assumed guilty" because his victims were "white" and "citizens of 
this country," where he was not. (Case 11407:53.) The report contained excerpts from a 
Muslim publication, which stated that Hassan was from Pakistan. (Case 11407:56.) It 
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also contained a letter from Updike, where she stated that Hassan may be considered 
"quite different in our kind of 'towns-y' Utah culture." (Case 11407:62.) 
In sum, early in the proceedings, Hassan expressed concern with the way in which 
he had been and would be treated in the community for the charges due to his nationality, 
race, and religious background. Hassan believed that members of the community were 
prejudiced against him; and he felt they misunderstood him because he was not from this 
country, but was from Pakistan and a member of the Muslim community. Those 
concerns were articulated in different forms in proceedings before the judge, as stated 
above. Nevertheless, when the judge obtained Hassan's waiver of the jury trial, the 
judge failed to mention Hassan's right to an impartial, unbiased jury. 
The judge failed to inform Hassan that he would be allowed to participate in 
choosing the jury, that he would be allowed to ask questions of the venire concerning 
prejudices, biases, and religious or racial tolerances, and to assess fairness. See e.g. State 
vJBall, 685 P.2d 1055 (Utah 1984) (allowing questions of venire about religion). 
Instead, the judge allowed Hassan's distrust in a community to blindly govern his 
decision to forego the jury. That cannot be construed as an informed, intelligent, 
knowing choice to waive a constitutional right. 
The colloquy for the jury waiver proceeded as follows: 
MR. MONTGOMERY: . . . My client is willing to waive a jury trial, and the 
State is in concurrence with that. 
THE COURT: I see. All right. 
Mr. Hassan, if you would — I'd like to have you sworn in. Would you please raise 
your right hand? (Defendant sworn.) 
All right. Mr. Hassan, do you understand that as a criminal defendant in both of 
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these trials, you have the right to have a jury of eight people to decide the outcome 
of the case? 
THE DEFEND ANT: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: And that if this were to be tried to the jury - and that that is a 
constitutional right that you have. All right. Do you understand that? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: That if this were to proceed to a trial by jury, a verdict of guilty 
would require an unanimous verdict of all eight jurors; do you understand that? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. And I understand that you wish to waive your right to 
a jury trial? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Do you understand that means that you'd be giving up your right 
to a jury trial? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: And is that what you want to do, give up your right to a jury trial? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor, I do. I have some reasoning for that --
THE COURT: Pardon me? 
THE DEFENDANT: I have some reasoning for making that decision. I have 
written something down. It's difficult to me, but these things I have --
THE COURT: Well, let me ask you this: I want to make sure that you 
understand what you are doing and that you are giving up your right to a jury trial 
knowingly and voluntarily and with foil understanding of what you are giving up. 
I am not trying to talk you out of it or into it. I'm just trying to make sure you 
understand what you are doing. 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: You talked about this decision to give up your right to jury trial 
with counsel? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Is anyone pressuring you to give up your right? 
THE DEFENDANT: No, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Are you doing it of your own free will? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Do you have any questions about - do you understand that a jury 
doesn't hear the evidence in this case, that it is tried to me as a judge. 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: And that I will be the only person making the decision on the 
guilt or innocence; do you understand? 
THE DEFENDANT: Absolutely. 
THE COURT: And is that what you want to have happen? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. 
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THE COURT: All right. Any questions about it. 
THE DEFENDANT: Not any question about this thing. 
THE COURT: All right. I'm focusing on the jury trial issue right now. Okay, 
I'm just focusing on that. 
You might have questions about other aspects of the trial, but if you have any 
questions about giving up the right to a jury trial, now is the time to ask me. 
THE DEFENDANT: No, Your Honor, I don't. 
THE COURT: All right. Based on your testimony, I find that you have 
knowingly, voluntarily, and with full understanding of your rights given up your 
Constitutional rights to a jury trial, and the case will proceed to the Court 
beginning on May 1st, and I'll schedule three days for that. 
In lieu of that, then jury instructions are not needed. We will begin the trial at 
9:30 in the morning. 
Are there any motions in limine? 
MR. MONTGOMERY: No, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. 
And Mr. Parker for the State, the State is also giving up its right to a trial by jury? 
MR. PARKER: We are, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
(R. 456:5-8.) The relevant pages from the April 17 transcript are attached as Addendum 
F. Since Hassan was not advised of his right to an impartial jury or of the process, where 
he would be able to participate injury selection and the court would supervise and in-
struct the jury on the law and facts, he did not know to ask about those matters. Indeed, 
when Hassan tried to explain to the court why he was waiving the jury, the court cut him 
off. (See R. 456:6); also Utah R. Crim. P. 20 (2003). 
Also, the colloquy was confusing. The judge stated, "a jury doesn't hear the evi-
dence in this case, that it is tried to me as a judge." (R. 456:7-8.) Yet, under the law, the 
jury hears the evidence and decides the facts. See e.g. Patton, 281 U.S. at 289 (this is an 
essential element of the jury trial); Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-10 (1999). In the event the 
court meant to say that without the jury the case will be tried to the judge, that message 
17 
was not conveyed since the court did not discuss the jury process. It discussed only that 
a "jury of eight" decides the outcome, and "an unanimous verdict." (R. 456:5-8.) 
Thereafter, the case proceeded to trial without a jury. (R. 450.) 
Throughout the proceedings, Hassan continued to express genuine concerns that 
members of the community were prejudiced against him because of his Middle Eastern 
background. He sent a letter to the judge stating that when he was first arrested, a 
transporting officer mentioned such things as "maybe when I go home I can go to 
Afghanistan and join the terrorist group." (Case 11407:166.) 
Also counsel for Hassan identified a letter to the court reflecting the victim's 
feelings toward defendant and his nationality and religious preferences. Counsel stated, 
[The victim's] statement, for example, [that] "[Hassan] ought to be deported and 
sent back to a country where it is okay to beat women," I think indicates to me 
some of her underlying feelings in this matter, that this man is different from a 
defendant who has been charged and convicted, say hypothetically, of exactly the 
same offense but who is a native-born Utahn and a member of a Christian faith or 
been raised in a Christian faith that stood before you. 
(R. 205:6.) 
The prosecutor also acknowledged that Hassan had articulated deep concerns 
about racism during the proceedings: "The only person [who] has brought up race 
repeatedly in this proceeding is the defendant and his wife. They have chose[n] to 
accuse various people of everything from rac[ism] to other bias[es] and other improper 
behavior." (R. 205:10 (sentencing proceedings).) The record supports that Hassan's 
concerns about community prejudices permeated pre- and post-trial proceedings. 
Finally, in connection with the hearing on the new trial motion, Hassan's former 
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trial attorney, Ed Montgomery, revealed that Hassan waived the jury because he "had 
always been concerned he might not get a fair shake from a white jury. I didn't 
necessarily disagree with him. To a certain extent I agreed about that. I believe part of it 
- and I think Rehan is in the best position to talk about that." (R. 454:57.) Montgomery 
also stated that Hassan felt Judge Stirba "would be more neutral and could give him a fair 
trial and a fair judgment. I think he had a good feel for [her] about it." (R. 454:57.) 
Since there is no indication on this record that Hassan was informed of his right to 
an impartial jury and the process relating thereto, his decision to proceed with a bench 
trial was based on limited information. That is, he incorrectly believed he could have a 
fair trial only if the judge served as fact finder. In that regard, the record fails to support 
that the waiver was informed and truly voluntary. The record in this case reflects plain 
error and manifest injustice with respect to the jury waiver, as further explained below. 
E. PLAIN ERROR AND MANIFEST INJUSTICE. 
This Court will address an issue raised first on appeal if the record supports plain 
error or manifest injustice. Those doctrines require the defendant to show that a plain, 
manifest, or obvious error occurred, affecting his substantial rights. This Court has 
stated the following with respect to the doctrines. 
In previous cases we have determined the meaning of "manifest injustice." 
In our first case to explicitly define this term, we held that "in most circumstances 
the term 'manifest injustice1 is synonymous with the 'plain error' standard expressly 
provided in [Utah R. Evid.] 103(d) and elaborated upon in Eldredge" State v. 
Verde, 110 P.2d 116, 121-22 (Utah 1989) (citing State v. Eldredge, 113 P.2d 29 
(Utah 1989)). We then noted that "as explained in Eldredge ... the plain error test 
of rule 103(d) is two-pronged. First the error must be 'plain' or 'manifest.' This is 
sometimes termed an 'obviousness' requirement.... Second, the error must be of 
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sufficient magnitude that it affects the substantial rights of a party." Id. at 122. 
.... Explaining the "manifest injustice" or "plain error" standard, we stated 
that "to obtain appellate relief from an alleged error that was not properly objected 
to, the appellant must show the following: (i) An error exists; (ii) the error should 
have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent the 
error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the 
appellant, or phrased differently, our confidence in the verdict is undermined." Id. 
at 1031 (quoting State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993)). We also noted 
that "if any one of those requirements is not met, plain error is not established." Id. 
Casey. 2003 UT 33, ffl[40-41; §^ e also Utah R. Crim. P. 30(a) (2003). 
To start, in this case error exists. As stated above, a defendant is entitled to be 
tried by a fair and impartial jury. That right is well-established. See supra. Point LA. It 
is essential to a fair trial. Utah Const, art. I, §12; U.S. Const, amend. VI; Saunders, 1999 
UT 59, TJ33 (recognizing that an impartial jury is essential to a fair trial); see_ also Patton, 
281 U.S. at 313. Utah courts have tools for selecting an impartial jury. See supra, Point 
LA. Also, the trial court supervises over the jury at trial, and provides instructions and 
advises the jury on the facts to ensure fairness. See e.g. Patton, 281 U.S. at 289. 
Before a trial court may accept a waiver of the jury, the court must ensure that the 
waiver is voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. See supra, Point LB. The duty of the 
court in taking a waiver must be discharged "with sound and advised discretion, with an 
eye to avoid unreasonable or undue departures from that mode of trial or from any of the 
essential elements thereof." Patton, 281 U.S. at 312-13; see. supra note 2, herein. 
In this case, in obtaining a waiver from Hassan, the trial court failed to advise him 
of his right to an impartial jury or any part of that process: that he would be entitled to 
participate injury selection and that the jury would decide the facts with supervision and 
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instruction from the court. (See R. 456:5-8); also supra. Point I.D. Thus, the waiver was 
not knowing and intelligent. That constitutes error. See supra, Point LA. & B. 
In this case, the error should have been plain and obvious to the trial court, where 
the right to an impartial jury is plainly guaranteed by the constitution. See supra. Point 
LA. Also, Hassan's concerns that he would not get a fair trial should have been obvious 
to the court where Hassan considered the community to be against him due to his 
nationality and religious beliefs. See supra. Point I.D. The court should have been 
sensitive to the fact that Hassan did not trust that a jury would be fair and impartial. 
Indeed, Hassan was prepared during the colloquy to read a statement to the court 
relating to the waiver. (R. 456:6.) Specifically, Hassan did not believe he would "get a 
fair shake from a white jury." (R. 454:57.) The court did not allow Hassan to read the 
statement. (R. 456:6.) Also, since the court did not inform Hassan of his right to an 
impartial jury, he did not know to ask questions about that. The court should have 
allowed Hassan to read the statement so the court could further explore Hassan's 
concerns, and assure him that if he proceeded with a jury, venire members would not be 
excluded from the jury due to their race, the court would take additional measures to 
impanel an unbiased jury, and the jury would be supervised by the court and instructed in 
the law to ensure fairness. See Utah R. Crim. P. 20 (if a party has no opportunity to state 
his concerns, the absence of an objection "shall not thereafter prejudice him"). 
By failing to advise Hassan of his right to an impartial jury and/or the process 
relating thereto, the trial court deprived Hassan of the opportunity to understand what he 
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was waiving. If Hassan had been properly informed, he would have proceeded to trial 
with a fair and impartial jury. As it was, Hassan believed the only way he could receive a 
fair trial based on the facts was to have the case tried to the bench. In that regard, his 
decision to waive the jury was not informed. (See. Case 11407:420-23 (court made no 
finding as to whether Hassan knew of or waived an impartial jury).) Since the judge 
failed to advise Hassan of his right to an impartial jury or any part of that process, the 
waiver was plainly unknowing. 
Next, the error was prejudicial. The right that was unknowingly waived is a 
substantial constitutional right. See. Utah Const, art. I, §12 (ensuring an impartial jury); 
U.S. Const, amend VI (same). It should have been carefully safeguarded by the court. 
Where the trial court failed to advise Hassan of an essential element impacting on his 
personal decision to waive the jury, the prejudice is presumed. See State v. Tarnawiecki, 
2000 UT App 186, Tfl8, 5 P.3d 1222 (presuming harm when the court failed to inform 
defendant during the plea colloquy that she was entitled to a "speedy trial before an 
impartial jury"); Com, v. Bullock, 332 A.2d 459, 460 (Pa. Super. 1974) (requiring 
remand where defendant was not informed of jury selection process). 
In State v. Cook, 714 P.2d 296 (Utah 1986), defendant was not present at a 
hearing when the prosecution waived the jury. Id_ at 297. Defendant was convicted after 
a bench trial. On appeal this Court presumed prejudice and reversed the conviction. It 
recognized that if defendant had been tried by a jury, there may have been an acquittal. 
Id. at 298. The same principle applies here. If Hassan had been properly informed of his 
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right to an impartial jury, he could have proceeded with a jury trial. In that instance, the 
jury may have acquitted Hassan of the charges against him. 
In addition, the error in this case was prejudicial where the evidence was in 
conflict. See State v. Andreason, 718 P.2d 400, 403 (Utah 1986) (when evidence is 
circumstantial or conflicting, the court is less likely to find harmless error); State v. Troy, 
688 P.2d 483, 486-87 (Utah 1984). 
Specifically, the Millers claimed to be the victims of burglary and assault, while 
Hassan denied that he forced his way into their apartment and assaulted them. (R. 450: 
166-72.) The Millers provided statements that were inconsistent with earlier statements 
and the physical evidence. (Id. at 193-211.) Also, the prosecutor in this matter acknow-
ledged that the case hinged on credibility (R. 450:187), the Millers' testimony was 
susceptible to attack, and the photographic evidence was "unclear." (R. 454:153.) 
Indeed, while Carol testified that Hassan brandished a gun, the judge was not per-
suaded by her testimony. (R.451:4, 7.) Where the judge was not persuaded in relevant 
part by Carol's claims, it is reasonable that a jury would have been entirely dissuaded by 
them, resulting in a more favorable outcome for Hassan. See e.g. Cook, 714 P.2d at 298. 
In this case, if Hassan had been informed of his right to an impartial jury and the 
process relating thereto, he would have proceeded with a jury trial. In that instance, with 
the conflicts/contradictions in testimony and various interpretations of the evidence, a 
reasonable likelihood exists that the jury would have reached a verdict more favorable to 
Hassan. He may have been acquitted of more than one charge. See State v. Mitchell, 779 
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P2d 1116, 1122-23 (Utah 1989) (the prejudice analysis is not the sufficiency analysis). 
Hassan has shown prejudice. Also, the error here affected a substantial right. 
See Cook, 714 P.2d at 298. Hassan requests that this Court reverse the convictions and 
remand the case for a new trial under the manifest-injustice and plain-error doctrines. 
POINT II. HASSAN WAS DENIED HIS RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN 
THE EVIDENTIARY HEARING ON THE NEW TRIAL MOTION. 
A. AN ACCUSED HAS THE RIGHT TO THE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL. 
The Sixth Amendment of the federal constitution provides the following: "In all 
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right...to have the Assistance of 
counsel for his defence."3 The U.S. Supreme Court considers the assistance of counsel to 
be "a requisite to the very existence of a fair trial." Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 31. 
The state constitution also ensures "the right to appear and defend in person and 
by counsel." Utah Const, art. I, § 12; Utah Code Ann. § 77-l-6(l)(a) (1995). Pursuant to 
the state and federal provisions, "[a] defendant in a criminal proceeding has a constitu-
tional right to the assistance of counsel at all critical stages of the prosecution." State v. 
Hamilton, 732 P.2d 505, 506-07 (Utah 1986); see also Kitchen v. U.S.. 227 F.3d 1014, 
1018-19 (7th Cir. 2000) (a new trial hearing is a critical stage); Williams v. Turpin, 87 
F.3d 1204, 1210 (11th Cir. 1996); Robinson v. Norris , 60 F.3d 457, 459-60 (8th Cir. 
1995), cert denied, 517 U.S. 1115 (1996); Menefield v. Borg, 881 F.2d 696, 699 (9th 
Cir. 1989); King v. State. 613 So.2d 888, 891 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993); Harper v. State , 
3
 The Sixth Amendment is made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Argersinger v. Hamlin. 407 U.S. 25, 27 (1972). 
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201 So.2d 65, 67 (Fla. 1967); Adams v. State. 405 S.E.2d 537, 539 (Ga. App. 1991.) 
B. A VALID WAIVER OF THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL MUST BE MADE 
KNOWINGLY, INTELLIGENTLY AND VOLUNTARILY. 
fl[B]efore the court may permit the defendant to proceed without the assistance of 
counsel, the court must conduct a thorough inquiry of the defendant to fulfill its duty of 
insuring that the defendant's waiver of counsel is knowingly, intelligently, and volun-
tarily made." Heaton, 958 P.2d at 917-18. The "thorough inquiry" is as follows: 
[T]he court must advise the defendant of the dangers and disadvantages of self-
representation "so that the record will establish that 'he knows what he is doing 
and his choice is made with eyes open.'" In addition, the trial court should (1) 
advise the defendant of his constitutional right to the assistance of counsel, as well 
as his constitutional right to represent himself; (2) ascertain that the defendant 
possesses the intelligence and capacity to understand and appreciate the 
consequences of the decision to represent himself, including the expectation that 
the defendant will comply with technical rules and the recognition that presenting 
a defense is not just a matter of telling one's story; and (3) ascertain that the 
defendant comprehends the nature of the charges and proceedings, the range of 
permissible punishments, and any additional facts essential to a broad 
understanding of the case. 
Id at 918 (cites omitted); State v. Frampton. 737 P.2d 183, 187-88 n. 12 (Utah 1987); 
State v. Bakalov, 849 P.2d 629, 633, 636 (Utah App.), modified per curium .862 P.2d 
1354 (Utah 1993); U.S. v. Padilla, 819 F.2d 952, 956 (10th Cir. 1987). 
This Court is able to review the issue of waiver only "after [the trial court] has 
conducted a meaningfiil inquiry of defendant." Heaton , 958 P.2d at 918. In the absence 
of such a colloquy, "this court will look at the record and make a de novo determination 
regarding the validity of the defendant's waiver only in extraordinary circumstances, the 
existence of which we will address on a case-by-case basis." kL_ 
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Even when a colloquy is conducted for the waiver of counsel, "a defendant who 
waives the right to counsel is entitled to withdraw that waiver and reassert the right." 
U.S. v. Taylor, 933 F.2d 307, 311 (5th Cir. 1991), cert, denied. 502 U.S. 883 (1991). 
Also, in considering the right to counsel, courts indulge every reasonable pre-
sumption against waiver. "[We do] not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental 
rights." Johnson, 304 U.S. at 464. "Because of the importance of the right to counsel 
and the heavy burden placed upon the trial court to protect this right, there is a 
presumption against waiver, and doubts concerning waiver must be resolved in the 
defendant's favor." Heaton, 958 P.2d at 917 (citing Johnson. 304 U.S. at 464). 
In this case, for a two-year period during post-trial proceedings, attorneys entered 
appearances for the defense and then demonstrated disinterest in the new trial motion that 
Hassan had filed. When Hassan finally became exasperated with the process, he asked 
the court to allow him to proceed pro se with a hearing on the motion.4 See infra. Point 
ILC. In each instance, Hassan's request was made out of desperation where his choice 
was to proceed with inadequate representation or alone. In that regard, the record fails to 
support that Hassan voluntarily waived his right to counsel. See State v. Arguelles, 2003 
UT 1, ^ 74, 63 P.3d 731 (defendant may show that waiver was not voluntary if he was 
4
 When Hassan appeared with counsel willing to proceed with the case, he was 
cooperative and respectful. (See R. 450,451, 448, 204.) Even when Hassan appeared with 
Mary Corporon and learned that she intended to withdraw from the case, and when he 
appeared with Rich Mauro after having represented himself, he did not express a genuine 
desire to proceed alone. (See R. 448,204.) Hassan requested to represent himself only when 
attorneys were unwilling or unable to proceed with his case. (R. 449, 455:1-11.) 
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offered counsel inadequate to the task of representing him); State v. Bakalov, 1999 UT 
45, TJ20, 979 P.2d 799 ("defendant cannot be forced to proceed with incompetent 
counsel"). In addition, the colloquies for self-representation were defective. See infra. 
Point II.C.2. Thus, the record fails to support a knowing, intelligent waiver of counsel. 
For the reasons set forth below, Hassan requests that this Court remand the case 
for proper proceedings on the new trial motion. 
C. HASSAN DID NOT KNOWINGLY, INTELLIGENTLY AND 
VOLUNTARILY WAIVE HIS RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN CONNECTION 
WITH THE EVIDENTIARY HEARING ON THE NEW TRIAL MOTION. 
In June 2000, after the bench trial, Hassan retained Mary Corporon to file a new 
trial motion. (See R. 448:3; Case 11407:202-03, 211-17.) In December 2000, Corporon 
asked to withdraw. (R. 448:10.) Corporon told the court that Hassan no longer had 
"resources"; "[h]e previously qualified for counsel [from] Legal Defender"; and "he will 
need a conflict counsel through Legal Defender's office and someone who can pursue an 
appeal once the motion for new trial has been addressed." (R. 448:11.) 
Hassan did not object to Corporon's withdrawal (R. 448:12). He requested the 
appointment of counsel. (R. 448:14.) Judge Stirba permitted Corporon to withdraw and 
ordered her to contact Salt Lake Legal Defender Association. (R. 448:16-17.)5 
5
 During pretrial proceedings, Hassan was represented briefly by David Grindstaff, then 
Ron Yengich, followed by Salt Lake Legal Defender Association ("SLLDA"), and Ed 
Montgomery. The record does not indicate why Grindstaff withdrew. (But see R. 455:58.) 
Hassan's relationship with Yengich apparently deteriorated. (See R. 449:9). 
When Yengich withdrew, Hassan qualified for a public defender. SLLDA entered an 
appearance and then withdrew due to a conflict. (Case 11407:73,77, 82 (indicating SLLDA 
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According to the marshaled evidence, several months later on August 2, 2001, 
Hassan appeared with conflict counsel Stephen McCaughey. McCaughey asked to with-
draw. He told the court he disagreed with Hassan's approach on the new trial motion, 
and that Hassan had raised concerns in the case of a "political nature." While McCaughey 
stated he would be willing to argue some issues in the case, he did not think the issues 
were meritorious, and he thought Hassan wanted to represent himself. (R. 449:3.) 
McCaughey also stated that Hassan considered the trial transcripts to be relevant 
to the new trial motion. (R. 449:3.) McCaughey did not review the transcripts. He 
reviewed only the findings of fact entered in connection with the trial and documents 
filed in the case. (R. 449:3-4.)6 McCaughey asserted that Hassan was entitled to the 
transcripts, and he again asked for leave to withdraw. (R. 449:4.) 
The trial court asked Hassan whether he wanted to argue the new trial motion pro 
se. (R. 449:4.) Hassan responded in the affirmative. Hassan told the court that the trial 
transcripts were the key to his case. "I have been asking for them [the transcripts]." (R. 
represented Carol Miller in an unrelated matter).) Montgomery was appointed as "conflict 
counsel" through SLLDA. (Case 11407:77.) He represented Hassan at trial. 
After the trial, Hassan and his wife hired Corporon. Shortly thereafter, Hassan 
qualified for a public defender. Attorneys, who appeared thereafter were assigned to the case 
as "conflict counsel" through SLLDA. (See Case 11407:275, 287-90, 294-95, 353, 407.) 
6
 There is no indication that McCaughey reviewed witness statements, police reports, 
pretrial discovery, transcripts of the preliminary hearings, or reports from potential expert 
witnesses. (See R. 449:3-4.) Without reviewing the trial facts or facts learned during pre-
or post-trial investigations, McCaughey would not be able to assess the matter under Utah 
R. Crim. P. 24(b) (2003). Under Utah law, a decision not to investigate the facts constitutes 
deficient performance by counsel. See State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 188 (Utah 1990). 
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449:5.) Hassan also told the court he had issues with previous counsel. (See R. 449:5 
(Corporon did not consult with him; McCaughey would not review the case;" Yengich 
totally messed up the case")); see Heaton, 958 P.2d at 913-14 (defendant claimed he was 
not receiving adequate legal representation; he felt forced to proceed on this own). 
Hassan then identified facts that he considered to be relevant to the new trial 
motion (R. 449:6-7 (stating the door was not broken; the victims misrepresented facts; 
and the officer failed to investigate a witness)), and matters that seemingly would not 
pertain to the motion. (See R. 449:8-9.) Hassan told the court, "I want to represent 
myself." "I want to be given an appropriate chance to prepare my case. I want my trial 
transcripts to be given a copy to me." (R. 449:11.) His requests reflected frustration at 
the system and at not being able to obtain the trial transcripts. (R. 449:8-13.) 
Thereafter, the trial court engaged in the following exchange with Hassan. 
THE COURT: Mr. Hassan, what I am going to do, at your request, is not hold 
this argument [on the new trial motion] today. We will get the transcript, and I 
will review it. You will have a copy. You will get a copy of it, as well, of course. 
And we will set a time to come back and allow you to argue this motion. I am not 
going to appoint another attorney. I am not certain of who has been hired and 
who has been appointed. But you have had Mr. Grindstaff, and Mr. Montgomery, 
Ms. Corporon, Mr. Yengich, Ms. Buchi from LDA,[7] and Mr. McCaughey. So I 
am not going to appoint another attorney. 
You indicate you want to argue it yourself. I want to talk to you about that 
a little bit, Mr. Hassan. I have allowed you to make this statement that you wanted 
to today. And I have no problem with that. But you need to understand a few 
things about the hearing we will have in the future. We will set the time in 
awhile. And that is that it will be an argument under the rule of law. With all due 
respect, this person you mentioned, whose case you are following, enemies of 
Islam, leaders of Pakistan, I don't, respectfully, care about those things. I am 
7
 Heidi Buchi is an attorney at SLLDA. See supra, note 5, herein. 
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interested in whether, under the law, as I understand it, in the State of Utah, in the 
United States, you are entitled to a new trial. So when we come back, that's what 
I am going to restrict you to. 
Tell me a little about yourself. I understand you have a college degree and 
an MBA, is that correct, or Master of Public Administration? 
THE DEFENDANT: I have a Master's of Commerce from back home, and a 
Bachelor's of Marketing. 
THE COURT: Do you have any experience with the legal system at all, other 
than what you have been through in regard to this case? I know the history of this 
case, and so on. But other than this case, do you have any familiarity with the 
legal system? 
THE DEFENDANT: No, sir, I don't. 
THE COURT: Have you, since you have been here since last July, have you been 
studying the law in prison, at all? 
THE DEFENDANT: No, sir. 
THE COURT: Do you understand the Rules of Criminal Procedure, what is re-
quired to demonstrate and what is required for you to show, to justify a new trial? 
THE DEFENDANT: I believe I can follow some guidelines of the motion of new 
trial which was filed by Mary Corporon, though she did not mention all the facts 
in that. I believe that I have seen what Mr. Parker's arguments is, and I can very 
well cover them by reasoning. The only reason I have to take charge of this case 
myself is that I don't have a Muslim representation. Unless I am entitled to get a 
Muslim representation or counsel from outside the state, from Los Angeles or 
something, which I don't know, I don 't trust the legal system over here. 
THE COURT: You are certainly entitled to hire any attorney you want to 
represent you. But I am not going to appoint anyone else, simply given the history 
of this case. Mr. Hassan, you need to understand that, in my opinion, it is a 
mistake for you to represent yourself at even this type of hearing. It is fairly 
restricted. The things I am going to consider are fairly restricted. I am simply 
going to consider if there are proper grounds that justify a new trial. Many of the 
things you have mentioned today, I have seen in writings that you have provided 
to the Court, and that Ms. Updike, at least they are signed by Elizabeth Updike, 
have provided to the Court, the case history and so on. Many of the things you 
have said, I have seen in some form or close to that form. Most of those, Mr. 
Hassan, will not be considered in this argument. So I think it is a mistake for you 
to pursue it yourself. But you are certainly entitled to represent yourself, and the 
Court and our legal system can't force an attorney upon you. But you should only 
do that and I will only allow it if I am convinced that you are able to do that. 
Now, it is obvious from me, not only from just your education, but from 
seeing the history of this case and seeing you here today, and hearing you, that you 
are an intelligent person. But I don't know that you have a full grasp of what Rule 
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24 is of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, which is the rule that dictates what 
is required to be shown to justify a new trial. 
But, Mr. Parker, anything else that you think I ought to inquire about with 
Mr. Hassan? I understand there is that case State v. Frampton . I haven't read it 
for some time. I should comply with in terms of allowing someone to represent 
themselves. Any other suggestions? 
(R. 449:15-18 (emphasis added).) The prosecutor considered the exchange sufficient. 
The relevant pages from the August 2, 2001 transcript are attached as Addendum G. 
Hassan again advised the court that he did not have "much knowledge of the legal 
system" and he was having difficulty hiring Muslim counsel. He requested additional 
time to find an attorney. He stated that if he was not successful in doing so, he would be 
willing to proceed alone. (R. 449:18-19); s_ee_ U.S. v. Meeks. 987 F.2d 575, 579 (9th Cir. 
1993), cert, denied, 114 S.Ct. 314 (1993) (recognizing that requests for substitute 
counsel do not constitute waiver of counsel); see. also U.S. v. Kienenberger, 13 F.3d 
1354, 1356 (9th Cir. 1994). 
The trial court then stated, "[W]hat I am going to do, Mr. Hassan, is schedule a 
hearing about 60 days away from now. If you can hire your own attorney, you can give 
that attorney this date. If you can't or don't, then you be prepared to argue that yourself." 
(R. 449:19; but see R. 448:13 (in earlier proceedings, the prosecutor maintained that a 
difference in strategy between defendant and counsel is not enough for withdrawal).) 
The court excused McCaughey. (R. 449:19-20.) The court also stated, 
[F]or the purposes of this argument, where there will not be evidence presented, 
where there will simply be argument, and you were present at the trial and testified 
at the trial, that you, Mr. Hassan, are able to represent yourself at that hearing. 
And I will allow that. Believing as I do, that you are capable of arguing and un-
derstanding Rule 24, basically have to show that an injustice was done at the trial. 
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So I will allow you to represent yourself. I will ask Mr. McCaughey, 
before he leaves, to do whatever he can to file the necessary papers to order that 
transcript. And then he will be off the case. The transcript will come to you. 
(R. 449:20 (emphasis added).) The proceedings concluded. Significantly, the judge did 
not ascertain whether Hassan intended to waive his right to counsel. (R. 449.) Instead, 
the judge told Hassan he would not appoint counsel even though Hassan was indigent. 
That was error. See Bakalov, 1999 UT 45, *fl20. In addition, Hassan's references to a 
Muslim attorney reflect that Hassan requested the assistance of counsel. See 
Kienenberger, 13 F.3d at 1356. 
The next hearing was on October 11, 2001, before Judge Burton. Hassan appeared 
pro se and again requested the trial transcripts. (R. 452:6-9.) The judge agreed that the 
transcripts were relevant to the new trial motion (R. 452:10), and he arranged to have 
them delivered to Hassan. The judge also asked about counsel for Hassan. He stated, 
"You don't want an attorney to help you out?" Hassan answered, "No, sir, I don't." The 
judge asked if Hassan was "tired of all that" and Hassan answered that he was "sick and 
tired of it. Been there, done that. Enough." (R. 452:12-13.) The court did not advise 
Hassan that he had a constitutional right to counsel, and the court did not inquire as to 
whether Hassan intended to waive that right. (R. 452.) 
During the next hearing, December 21, 2001, Hassan asked Judge Burton for 
assistance in arranging the attendance of certain witnesses for an evidentiary hearing on 
the new trial motion. (See R. 457:2.) The judge advised Hassan that the court could not 
help in such matters and suggested that Hassan obtain assistance from a case worker at 
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the prison. (R. 457:3.) The judge also advised Hassan that he could use an "attorney that 
the State will appoint for you." (R.457:8.) 
In response to that suggestion, Hassan said that would be fine, but he still wanted 
to represent himself. (Id.); see also Kienenberger, 13 F.3d at 1356 (requests to self-
represent accompanied by requests for counsel do not constitute a waiver of counsel). 
When the judge asked, "Do you feel comfortable for me to appoint an attorney to help 
you on that?" Hassan answered, "Exactly, I will appreciate that." (R. 457:8-9); see. U.S. 
v. Holmen, 586 F.2d 322, 324 (4th Cir. 1978) (wherepro se defendant requests counsel 
after trial, he has invoked his right to representation). The court appointed SLLDA to 
assist Hassan. (See Case 11407:350); supra note 5, herein. 
On February 1, 2002, Hassan again appeared pro se. (R. 453:3.) The prosecutor 
suggested Hassan waive his right to "standby counsel" so the parties could move forward 
on the new trial motion. (Id.) Hassan responded that conflict counsel Richard Mauro 
and Michael Sikora were his attorneys. (IcL_); see supra note 5, herein. He had not met 
them. (Id at 3-4.) Also, he did not have "any problem with the standby counsel." (Id.) 
Hassan then expressed frustration with the continued delays and he discussed 
matters relating to the new trial motion. (R. 453:5, 7-8.) Hassan made reference to a 
Muslim attorney. He also stated he wanted to "fight this thing by myself, and because I 
think that I can, I don't want to even bother any more attorney, I think I'm capable of 
doing it myself." (R. 453:9.) Hassan did not want "further delay," inasmuch as 18 
months had passed since he filed the new trial motion. (See R. 453:10.) Hassan 
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identified the grounds for the new trial motion. (R. 453:11-17.) The judge then 
continued the hearing in order that counsel could assist Hassan. (R. 453:20.) 
On June 7, 2002, Hassan appeared with conflict counsel Richard Mauro. (R. 
204:3.) Hassan indicated that he was comfortable with Mauro's assistance "as long as he 
does not override my decision" and is "doing the right job." (R. 204:9.) Mauro assured 
the court that he had discussed matters with Hassan and they agreed on a course of 
action. (R. 204:9.) Mauro stated that based on the memorandum filed for the new trial 
motion, he considered it necessary to conduct an investigation. (R. 204:4.) 
In July 2002, Mauro requested leave to withdraw as court-appointed counsel on 
the grounds that Hassan had filed a complaint with the Utah State Bar against him for 
"stealing" copies of trial pleadings. (Case 11407:393-98.)8 
When Hassan appeared in court again on August 16, 2002, the judge informed 
him that Mauro would be allowed to withdraw from the case. (R. 455:2.) Manny Garcia 
appeared as new conflict counsel. (Id.); see supra note 5, herein. Garcia was not familiar 
with the case; he was not prepared to proceed in any respect with the new trial motion. 
(R. 455:4-5.) Hassan stated the following to the judge: 
My intentions are, for right now is to go ahead and - and - and go to proceedings 
right now, whatever I have already because I have delayed my Board of Pardon 
date and stuff like that and it's been going on for too long. And if it goes -
because if I - I get approved or I don't get approved, whatever it is, you know, I -
I need to just go ahead and - with the proceedings today. 
8
 Mauro borrowed Hassan's transcripts sometime between February 1 and July 2002, and 
had not yet return them. Hassan contacted the Utah State Bar about the transcripts, resulting 
in an investigation against Mauro. (See Case 11407:397.) 
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(R. 455:3-4.) The judge asked if Hassan wanted Garcia to help. Hassan answered that 
Garcia may not be familiar with the case. (Id.) When that was confirmed (idL at 4, 7-8), 
the prosecutor suggested that "we take a little time for counsel to talk to the defendant 
and gather a little information, at least help [Hassan] make that decision before we do 
proceed." (R. 455:6.) Garcia responded that Hassan "wants to represent himself \ (Id.) 
Hassan stated that he was prepared to go forward with the proceedings; he felt 
"desperately in the need of getting the proceeding^ ] done." (R. 455:9.) 
Thereafter, the following colloquy ensued: 
THE COURT: No question that Mr. Garcia will want to spend a little time on it. 
MR. HASSAN: Yes. 
THE COURT: So, do you want to - say you want to go on your own? I mean -
MR. HASSAN: Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: - I think you're clear enough minded, I know that you know the 
process well. Mr. Garcia would be happy to help you. It would take a little while. 
I mean, I think Mr. Garcia would be reluctant to say, yeah, let's go today, there's a 
lot at stake for you and then Mr. Garcia has [a] duty to do the very best he can. So-
MR. GARCIA: I have an obligation to be competent. 
THE COURT: Yeah. And so you can - he can't go ahead today and help you. I 
don't think he could ever take that position. 
MR. GARCIA: I know. That's what I'm saying. I would-
THE COURT: So, in your mind, if today is the day, then you 're probably going 
to have to say, I don't want Mr. Garcia's help, I'm going to go on my own.[9] 
MR. HASSAN: Not at this point then, I don't want - I'm sorry, but I'm ready to -
MR. GARCIA: Nothing personal. 
THE COURT: Mr. Garcia is not going to take it personally. 
MR. GARCIA: May I be excused? 
THE COURT: You may. 
MR. GARCIA: Thank you. 
9
 Certainly the judge could have advised Hassan that "today" is not "the day", or allowed 
Garcia and Hassan a moment to consult in private. If the judge had taken either of those 
actions, Hassan would not have been forced to choose between the sense that the court would 
finally consider the new trial motion and his constitutional right to counsel. 
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MR. PARKER: I do think, your Honor, if he's going to go on his own, we need 
to go over what is - seems to be known as the Frampton inquiries and that is to 
check with him to see if he understands what he's doing and the results and 
consequences and his inexperience to be able to represent himself. 
THE COURT: Well, I kind of thought he - he had demonstrated that before, but 
I mean -
MR. PARKER: I think we at least ought to go through the questions and inquire 
of him, whether or not the answer is obvious. 
THE COURT: All right. Well, let me try that, Mr. Hassan. 
You, at this juncture, you're clearly not able to hire an attorney, you can't go out 
and pay for one? 
MR. HASSAN: No. I can't. 
THE COURT: Okay. So, we know that's a fact, 'cause you've been in custody 
for like three years now. 
MR. HASSAN: Two-and-a-half. 
THE COURT: Two-and-a-half. All right. 
So, vou 'd be a person to whom we could appoint an attorney and you understand 
we'd do that if you wanted, the State would pay for your attorney. You've decided 
today, if I understood you right, you don't want the attorney's help. 
MR. HASSAN: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: And so, do you feel like you're competent to go ahead and help 
yourself? 
MR. HASSAN: I'm pretty sure I'm competent. 
THE COURT: You understand that Mr. Parker is trained in the law and that he 
knows what's going on and in theory -
MR. HASSAN: Yeah. And I -
THE COURT: I'm trained in the law and I'm supposed to know what's going on. 
MR. HASSAN: Yeah. 
THE COURT: And so you're the only one of the three of us in -
MR. HASSAN: I know I've got a -
THE COURT: -theory-
MR. HASSAN: - handicap or whatever, but I have been there, done that, I - /_ 
just don't want to have any more attorneys that won 7 do what I want and -
THE COURT: Okay 
MR. HASSAN: -just keep on going. 
THE COURT: Now, you obviously have other remedies besides this new trial. 
And I think you've talked about it, you want to appeal something, -
MR. HASSAN: Uh huh. 
THE COURT: - which is fine, because you understand you've got to get this 
one out of the way first before you go that step; but you understand that if you go 
ahead and because you aren't experienced and able, you might be giving away 
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opportunities or rights that other folks have? 
MR. HASSAN: Yeah. I - I'm aware of that, the - the - like I said, the only 
handicap which I'm having with not having attorneys is those - that those people 
are not subpoenaed, and but I have - I have those statements and stuff that what I 
will present, but otherwise, you know, they would have been subpoenaed. That's 
something which the Court should keep in mind, you know, that I don't have -
you know, I tried everything to get those people subpoenaed. 
THE COURT: Well, but I mean, so that brings up a very good point. I mean, 
you're giving up the right to have folks come in and give testimony in your behalf 
not in your personal behalf but in behalf of a motion that you bring. 
And is that a wise thing for you to do? 
MR. HASSAN: Your Honor, I - I'm sick and tired of the situation. I just do not 
have any more (inaudible) to be with attorneys, be it attorneys and - but they all 
make me look bad and I, you know, it just - whatever happens, it just - it's not -
it's not that we (inaudible) different way or maybe I'm supposed to be 
representing whatever handicap I have, whatever I present, I'll present. I know 
that we're supposed to be (inaudible) and you know, it would be documented type 
stuff, you know, I - I assume. And I'm just saying I just want to bring all the 
(inaudible) I can bring and then from there onwards, I just want the transcripts, 
you know, (inaudible) that's all, and then you (inaudible). 
THE COURT: Okay. And I guess since you're just sick and tired, that's really 
why you're doing this; is that a wise thing to do? You're just kind of full of it - I 
mean tired of it and so on. 
MR. HASSAN: It's a - it's - the thing is that the way I - I can present myself, the 
way I know the cases, the way I know the situation is much better than - than the 
way other attorneys know and the way they - I called earlier to bring all those 
things which I wanted him to bring, you know, so it's - it's always going to be a 
handicap because I'm - I'm fighting this (inaudible) misconduct and so attorneys 
don't want to fight against their own (inaudible). 
THE COURT: I gotcha. All right. Well, you're comfortable with what you're 
doing? 
MR. HASSAN: Yes. 
THE COURT: Mr. Parker, should we ask him anything more? 
MR. PARKER: No. I - I think that's sufficient, your Honor. I would place on 
the record that we have been here numerous times and had discussions with the 
defendant about various aspects of this proceeding and he's written both the Court 
and myself and other people numerous times also expressing his desires. 
(R. 455:9-14 (emphasis added).) The relevant pages from the August 16 transcript are 
attached as Addendum H. Hassan then proceeded to identify the grounds for the new 
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trial motion. On September 17, 2002, the trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing on 
the matter. (R. 454.) Hassan appeared pro se. (Id.) 
1. Hassan did not voluntarily waive counsel for the evidentiary hearing . When a 
court is faced with a defendant who refuses to proceed with appointed counsel or insists 
on proceeding pro se, "the court must carefully consider the defendant's right to self-
representation with his right to counsel." Heaton, 958 P.2d at 917. 
In Bakalov, 1999 UT 45, defendant was convicted of rape during "retrial" where 
he represented himself. IcL at ^[1. On appeal, defendant claimed he was "deprived the 
right to assistance of counsel because he did not unequivocally and knowingly request 
self-representation." Id. at 13. This Court determined that Bakalov voluntarily waived 
counsel based on the following. 
Bakalov was indigent. The trial court appointed competent counsel to represent 
him. Bakalov refused to cooperate with counsel, compelling counsel to withdraw. IcL_ at 
Tfl8. When the trial judge attempted to conduct a "Frampton" colloquy on self-represen-
tation, Bakalov "doggedly refused to answer the court's questions," insisting on "non-
LDA or out-of-state counsel." IdL. at [^24. The trial court assigned another attorney to the 
case. That attorney also withdrew because of Bakalov's resistence. IcL. at ^fi|18, 24. 
The trial court attempted another Frampton colloquy, and again Bakalov refused 
to cooperate. Given Bakalov's "unwieldy obstinance," icL_ at Tf24, the court considered 
Bakalov's rejection of prior counsel to be a waiver and appointed standby counsel, who 
later was substituted. IcL at ^24-25. During four subsequent proceedings, the trial court 
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attempted additional colloquies, kL at Yf9, 25, while Bakalov remained uncooperative 
until the final hearing. There, Bakalov waived his right to counsel. Id . at ^25. Under the 
circumstances, the trial judge found that Bakalov knowingly waived counsel. 
This Court affirmed the ruling. It stated that early on, Bakalov made his 
intentions clear "that he wanted to represent himself if the only alternative was represen-
tation by appointed counsel." Id_ at ^21. In addition, Bakalov did not identify concerns 
with the qualifications or conduct of attorneys appointed to represent him in the case. 
Rather, BakaloVs complaints concerned the trial court's refusal to appoint the attorney of 
his choice. Id at [^20. In the end, "[t]he alternatives given Bakalov by the trial court—to 
accept representation by competent counsel as already provided or represent himself--
were constitutionally acceptable, and Bakalov's choice was voluntary." IcL_ 
Hassan's case compels a different result. Hassan was required to chose between 
counsel disinterested in the case, and proceeding pro se. In that regard, Hassan's choice 
to proceed pro se was not entirely voluntary. He did not waive his right to counsel. 
Consider the August 2, 2001 hearing. McCaughey advised the court that he could 
argue some of the issues raised in the new trial motion. He also advised the court that he 
disagreed with Hassan's "take on the case," Hassan wanted the trial transcripts, and 
Hassan wished to represent himself McCaughey asked to withdraw. (R. 449:3-4.) 
The court asked Hassan if he wanted the transcripts and to argue the matter 
himself. Hassan answered yes. (R. 449:4.) He told the court that McCaughey was not 
familiar with his case. (R. 449:9.) Indeed, McCaughey did not order or review the trial 
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transcripts in connection with representing Hassan on the motion. See supra, note 6. 
The court then engaged in a colloquy on self-representation. The judge advised 
Hassan that he would not appoint another attorney; Hassan could proceed alone or hire 
counsel. (R. 449:14, 17.) The choices presented to Hassan were constitutionally of-
fensive. See Bakalov, 1999 UT 45, ^ 20. The court excused McCaughey. (R. 449:19-20.) 
Even if Hassan should have known from prior experiences that he was entitled to court-
appointed counsel, the judge conveyed the opposite message to him. (R. 449:15-17.) 
During that same hearing, Hassan made a proposal for Muslim counsel. While he 
would not be entitled to the attorney of his choice, his statements constituted a request for 
counsel. (See R. 449:18-19); see also Kienenberger. 13 F.3d at 1356; Heaton, 958 P.2d 
at 917 (because of the importance of the right to counsel, doubts concerning waiver must 
be resolved in favor of the right to counsel). 
Next, during a hearing on December 21, 2001, the court referred the case to 
SLLDA. (Case 11407:350); supra note 5, herein. On February 1, 2002, although coun-
sel was appointed, Hassan appeared alone and argued matters relating to the new trial 
motion. (See R. 453:10-17.) On June 7, 2002, Hassan appeared with counsel (R. 204), 
who ultimately withdrew due to a conflict. (Case 11407:393.) 
On August 16, 2002, Hassan appeared with Manny Garcia. Garcia and Hassan 
met for the first time at the hearing. Garcia knew nothing about the case. The prosecutor 
suggested that the court allow Garcia and Hassan to consult. Garcia stated that Hassan 
"wants to represent himself. (R. 455: 6.) Hassan told the court he was desperate and he 
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needed to get the proceedings done. (Id. at 9.) 
The trial court then advised Hassan that he could proceed with the new trial 
motion today or proceed with Garcia's help. The judge did not indicate what that help 
would entail or how much time it would take Garcia to become familiar with the case, 
and the judge did not allow Garcia and Hassan to consult. (R. 455:9-10). Hassan's 
answer to the choices presented by the court was hesitant and apologetic: "Not at this 
point then, I don't want — I'm sorry, but I'm ready to -." (Id.) 
The judge then excused Garcia (id_.) before a colloquy ensued. Arguelles, 2003 
UT 1, y74 (stating defendant may show that his waiver of counsel was not voluntary 
where he was offered counsel who was inadequate to the task of representing him); 
Bakalov, 1999 UT 45, ^ [20. The judge advised Hassan that if he wanted counsel, the 
judge would appoint an attorney to represent him. The judge stated he understood 
Hassan did not want an attorney. (R. 455:11-12.) Hassan answered in the affirmative. 
Without suggesting a solution that would protect Hassan's constitutional right to 
be represented by counsel and allow for a hearing on the new trial motion without 
repeated delays, the court continued a colloquy for self-representation. (R. 455:11-14.) 
In the end, as set forth above, Hassan did not request to represent himself except 
to avoid repeated delays and when counsel appeared unwilling or unprepared to proceed 
with a hearing on Hassan's new trial motion. Hassan made the request as the only 
practical option available to him. In that regard, his decision to proceed pro se was not 
voluntary. In fact, his decision was made out of desperation and exasperation. Hassan 
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requests that this Court vacate the trial court's ruling on the new trial motion, and remand 
the case for further proceedings. 
2. Assuming arguendo Hassan voluntarily waived counsel the trial court failed 
to conduct a proper colloquy. Thus, the waiver was unknowing. The trial court was 
required to conduct a proper colloquy before permitting the defendant to proceed pro se. 
Heaton, 958 P.2d at 917-18; Frampton, 737 P.2d at 187-88. 
That is, the trial court was required to inform Hassan of the "dangers and disad-
vantages of self-representation 'so that the record will establish that "he knows what he is 
doing and his choice is made with eyes open."'" Heaton, 958 P.2d at 918. Also, the trial 
court was required to ascertain that Hassan possessed "the intelligence and capacity to 
understand and appreciate the consequences of the decision to represent himself, in-
cluding the expectation that the defendant will comply with technical rules." And the 
court was required to ascertain that Hassan comprehended the nature of the proceedings, 
"and any additional facts essential to a broad understanding of the case." IcL; see also 
Frampton, 737 P.2d at 188 (defendant's educational background is not enough to show 
that he made an informed decision to waive counsel); Bakalov, 849 P.2d at 633, 636. 
In this matter, the trial court failed to comply with Frampton and Heaton. The 
colloquies were inadequate and improper for several reasons. First, the colloquies were 
misplaced since Hassan's statements concerning counsel did not constitute a voluntary 
waiver of the right to counsel. (See. supra. Point II.C.l.) To the extent there was ambi-
guity or doubt concerning Hassan's requests, the trial court was required to resolve those 
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doubts in favor of Hassan's right to counsel. Heaton, 958 P.2d at 917-18; Bakalov. 1999 
UT 45, Tfl6 (an equivocal request is a request for counsel); Johnson , 304 U.S. at 464. 
Second, assuming arguendo Hassan voluntarily requested to proceed pro se, the 
colloquies were defective. Here, the trial court judges anticipated that Hassan would re-
present himself only in presenting argument on the new trial motion. (R. 449:20; 455: 
13.) Each judge engaged in a colloquy to that effect. See supra Point II.C, pp. 27-38. 
Significantly, the judges did not contemplate an evidentiary hearing on the motion. Yet, 
that is what occurred. Thus, the colloquies were inadequate for such a hearing. 
Specifically, during the colloquy in August 2001, the court asked about Hassan's 
education (two college degrees in Pakistan) and his experiences in the legal system (only 
this case). (R. 449:15-16.) The court asked whether Hassan understood the procedural 
rules (he believed he could follow "some guidelines" and address issues "by reasoning"). 
(Id.) The court advised Hassan that it was a mistake to represent himself, the hearing 
would be restricted to argument on the new trial motion (no evidence), and the court 
would not consider certain papers filed by Hassan and his wife. (R. 449:17-20.) The 
court considered Hassan to be intelligent, and the court doubted that Hassan had "a full 
grasp of what Rule 24 is." (R. 449:17.) The court made reference to a colloquy set forth 
in Frampton, and ruled Hassan could represent himself. (R. 449:18-20.) 
A year later, during the second colloquy, Hassan appeared with counsel who was 
unprepared to proceed with the case. Hassan stated he was desperately in need of moving 
forward with the new trial motion. (R. 455:4, 9.) The court excused counsel and advised 
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Hassan that an attorney would be appointed if he wanted one. (R. 455:10-11.) The 
judge asked if Hassan felt competent to "help" himself. The judge advised Hassan that 
he and the prosecutor were law trained, and that Hassan's lack of training was a 
disadvantage. The judge advised Hassan that he had other remedies, "you want to appeal 
something". (R. 455:12.) And the judge told Hassan he may "be giving away 
opportunities or rights that other folks have." (R.455:13.) 
During the second colloquy, the court specifically contemplated Hassan's self-
representation only with respect to oral argument on the motion. The court advised 
Hassan that he was giving up the right to have witnesses testify for the new trial motion. 
(R. 455:13.) When the court asked if that was "a wise thing for you to do," Hassan 
answered that he was "sick and tired of the situation." (Id.) He expressed frustration 
with the attorneys. (Id.) 
During the colloquies, the trial court did not contemplate Hassan's self-represen-
tation in the context of the evidentiary hearing that occurred. (R. 449:20; 455:13.) That 
is, the court failed to advise Hassan of the dangers/disadvantages of self-representation in 
such a hearing. Hassan was not informed that he could take the witness stand, or that if 
he testified, he would have to ask questions of himself and he would be cross-examined 
by the prosecutor without the assistance of counsel. The court failed to contemplate those 
matters or address those rights — and the disadvantages associated with them. Indeed, 
Hassan forfeited the right to testify in the evidentiary hearing without ever understanding 
that he had such a right. (See R. 454.) Also, the judge failed to determine whether Has-
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san understood he may waive important appellate issues if he failed to raise them in the 
hearing. See Williams, 87 F.3d at 1210 (rights on appeal may be affected if defendant is 
denied counsel at the hearing on the new trial motion); Menefield, 881 F.2d at 698-99. 
The court failed to ascertain whether Hassan possessed "the intelligence and 
capacity to understand and appreciate the consequences of the decision to represent 
himself," Heaton, 958 P.2d at 918, in the context of the evidentiary hearing, "including 
the expectation that the defendant will comply with technical rules". Id_ That is, the 
court failed to inquire whether Hassan was familiar with evidentiary and procedural rules 
for an evidentiary hearing. See supra, pp. 27-38; see also Utah R. Crim. P. 1(b) (2003); 
UtahR. Evid. 101 & 1101(a) (2003); Frampton., 737 P.2d at 187-88 n.12. Since Hassan 
was not asked about the rules, he unknowingly ran the risk that the court would disregard 
evidence and arguments that failed to comply with procedure. 
And the court failed to explore additional matters essential to a broad under-
standing of what may be required in an evidentiary hearing, see. Heaton, 958 P.2d at 917-
18, including that Hassan had the right to testify in the hearing on his own behalf, and 
that his failure to raise issues in connection with the motion would preclude this Court 
from reaching the merits of such issues on appeal. See supra, pp. 27-38. In short, the 
trial court failed to protect Hassan's rights where the evidentiary hearing was concerned. 
Nevertheless, the court conducted such a hearing in this case on the new trial motion. 
There is no basis here to find that Hassan made a knowing, intelligent waiver of 
his right to counsel for the evidentiary hearing. See ABA Stds for Crim. Justice Pro-
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viding Def. Services, std 5-8.2 (3d. ed. 1992) (stating courts should renew the offer for 
counsel at each stage of the proceedings where defendant appears without counsel). 
Stated a different way, where the trial court determined that Hassan could 
represent himself only in connection with argument on the new trial motion, the colloquy 
was insufficient to protect Hassan's right to counsel where the evidentiary hearing was 
concerned. The evidentiary hearing involved different legal talents and implicated 
additional procedural rules and processes. It involved cross-examinations, and 
implicated Hassan's right to testify. The trial court failed to properly ascertain whether 
defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel. Heaton. 958 P.2d at 
917-18, 919. Where the colloquy was inadequate, Hassan requests that this Court 
remand the case for further proceedings on the new trial motion. 
D. PLAIN ERROR AND MANIFEST INJUSTICE. 
As stated supra. Point I.E., this Court may address an issue raised for the first time 
on appeal under the plain-error and manifest-injustice doctrines. The doctrines are 
similar. A defendant must show that a plain, obvious error occurred, and the error was 
harmful, affecting a substantial right of the defendant. Casey, 2003 UT 33, ^ [40-41; see 
Saunders. 1999 UT 59, [^62 n.4 (citing State v. Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993)). 
Plain and obvious error exists in this case. As set forth above, the trial court 
allowed Hassan to proceed pro se with an evidentiary hearing without an adequate 
colloquy. See supra, Point II.C, herein. The waiver was not voluntary, supra. Point 
II.C.l., and the colloquy was defective under established Utah law. Supra Point II.C.2. 
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The error in this case was obvious. In connection with both colloquies, reference 
was made in open court to Frampton. Judge Lubeck stated, "I understand there is that 
case State v. Frampton. I haven't read it for some time. I should comply with it in terms 
of allowing someone to represent themselves." (R. 449:18.) Also, in Judge Burton's 
court, the prosecutor reminded the judge that "we need to go over what is — seems to be 
known as the Frampton inquiries and that is to check with [defendant] to see if he 
understands what he's doing and the results and consequences and his inexperience to be 
able to represent himself." (R. 455:10-11.) 
Frampton and its progeny require that before a court may allow a defendant to 
proceed pro se, the court must advise the defendant of the dangers/disadvantages of self-
representation; and ascertain that defendant possesses the capacity to understand and 
appreciate the consequences of the decision to represent himself, and comprehends the 
nature of the proceedings and additional facts essential to a broad understanding of the 
case. Heaton, 958 P.2d at 917-18 (citing Frampton. 737 P.2d at 187-88). The judges 
here were aware that they were required to conduct a proper colloquy. (R. 449:18; 
455:10-11.) Yet they failed to ascertain what that colloquy was or contemplate what it 
would entail for an evidentiary hearing. Thus, the defective colloquies in this case 
should have been plainly obvious to the trial courts. See supra. Point II.C.2. 
With respect to the prejudice analysis, the right to the assistance of counsel at all 
critical stages of a criminal case is a substantial, constitutional right. See Heaton, 958 
P.2d at 917-18; Hamilton, 732 P.2d at 506-07; King, 613 So.2d at 891; Adams, 405 
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S.E.2d 537. Thus, where a defendant is denied his right to counsel due to trial court 
error, prejudice is presumed. Templin, 805 P.2d at 186 n.20 (recognizing that in a claim 
based on denial of counsel, prejudice is presumed). 
In other cases where the trial court failed to engage in a proper colloquy dealing 
with a constitutional right, Utah courts presumed prejudice. See State v. Ostler, 2000 UT 
App 28, TJ24, 996 P.2d 1065 (failure to engage in a proper colloquy under Rule 11 
constituted prejudicial error), affd, 2001 UT 68, 31 P.3d 528; see also Cook, 714 P.2d at 
298; Robinson, 60 F.3d at 459-60. The presumption of prejudice applies here. 
In addition, Hassan was prejudiced where he had an argument that he would have 
been able to develop with counsel's assistance at the evidentiary hearing on the new trial 
motion. Specifically, the record supports that prior to trial, the state offered to drop the 
lst° felony charges if Hassan entered a plea for assault. (See R. 454:77.) Hassan finally 
declined the offer because he believed the defense had settled on a trial strategy for the 
case. (See R. 454:143-44; 454:41; 454:104.) Hassan believed the defense would present 
an expert locksmith who would testify that the burglary could not have happened the way 
the Millers described it. (See R. 454:41, 44.) He understood that the locksmith would 
say the door and lock to the Millers' apartment were not damaged in a way to support that 
Hassan had kicked it in. (See supra Statement of Facts, pp. 5-6.) Hassan identified two 
potential locksmiths: Mike Moulton and Phillip Chiburn. (R. 454:36.) Hassan believed 
that payment had been arranged for the expert's time in the case. (R. 454:38, 114.) 
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As it turned out, Montgomery decided not to call a locksmith to testify at trial.10 
He decided instead to use the photos and to question the police officer about the door and 
lock. (See R. 454:52.) Montgomery understood that the expert was important to Hassan. 
(R. 454:114.) Nevertheless, he made the "tactical" decision not to call the expert "well 
before trial"; Montgomery did not disclose the change in trial strategy to Hassan until 
much later. (R. 454:38, 41-42, 114.) 
Yet, because Hassan's final decision not to accept the state's plea offer was based 
on the trial strategy that he and Montgomery had discussed (R. 454:143-44), Montgo-
mery had an obligation to discuss the change in strategy with Hassan. See Utah R. Prof. 
Cond. 1.3, 1.4 (2003). It had a direct impact on Hassan's decision regarding the state's 
plea offer. See ABA Stds for Crim. Justice Pros. Function and Def. Function, std 4-
5.2(a) (3d ed. 1993) (the decision as to whether to accept a plea agreement is a decision 
for the accused). Instead, Hassan learned about the matter too late. (R. 454:114.) 
In the end, Montgomery's decision not to use an expert may have compromised 
the case. At trial, when Montgomery examined the police officer, the court prohibited 
questions about the Millers' doorframe and lock that allegedly were damaged during the 
10
 Montgomery claimed the only expert he investigated disclosed information favorable 
to the state. (R. 454:41.) Montgomery could not identify that purported expert. (R. 
454:36.) While Montgomery admitted that other locksmiths could have provided statements 
favorable to the defense, he acknowledged that he did not investigate those potential experts. 
(R. 454:36,41); see Templin, 805 P.2d at 188 (inadequate investigation constitutes deficient 
performance by counsel). With counsel's assistance at the hearing on the new trial motion, 
Hassan would have been able to investigate Montgomery's claims, identify weaknesses 
there, testify at the hearing, and present relevant expert testimony from a locksmith to support 
the trial strategy that Hassan believed he and Montgomery had agreed to. 
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burglary. The court ruled that the evidence should be presented through an expert. (R. 
450:129-32.) Thus, Montgomery had to forego the examination on the matter. 
With the assistance of counsel at the hearing on the new trial motion, Hassan 
would have been able to present testimony from a locksmith, testify on his own behalf, 
and point out weaknesses in Montgomery's purported reasons for not calling the expert at 
trial. Hassan also would have been able to develop facts concerning his reliance on the 
trial strategy and argue that Montgomery's unilateral, "tactical" change in strategy 
violated Hassan's trust and impacted on his rights in the case. Since Hassan was not 
given the choice of counsel for the evidentiary hearing on the new trial motion, he was 
not able to protect himself or claims he had concerning Montgomery's representation. 
Hassan has demonstrated prejudice. Also, the error in this case had an affect on a 
substantial right. On that basis, Hassan requests that this Court vacate the trial court's 
ruling on the new trial motion, and remand the case for further proceedings where 
Hassan may be entitled to the assistance of counsel. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, Hassan respectfully requests that this Court 
reverse and remand this case for further proceedings. Hassan is incarcerated. 
SUBMITTED this 3?day of S^tU^ 2003. 
LINDA M.JONES [J 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEF. ASSOC. 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
77-1-6. Rights of defendant. 
(1) In criminal prosecutions the defendant is entitled: 
(a) To appear in person and defend in person or by counsel; 
(b) To receive a copy of the accusation filed against him; 
(c) To testify in his own behalf; 
(d) To be confronted by the witnesses against him; 
(e) To have compulsory process to insure the attendance of witnesses in 
his behalf; 
(f) To a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district 
where the offense is alleged to have been committed; 
(g) To the right of appeal in all cases; and 
(h) To be admitted to bail in accordance with provisions of law, or be 
entitled to a trial within 30 days after arraignment if unable to post bail 
and if the business of the court permits. 
(2) In addition: 
(a) No person shall be put twice in jeopardy for the same offense; 
(b) No accused person shall, before final judgment, be compelled to 
advance money or fees to secure rights guaranteed by the Constitution or 
the laws of Utah, or to pay the costs of those rights when received; 
(c) No person shall be compelled to give evidence against himself; 
(d) A wife shall not be compelled to testify against her husband nor a 
husband against his wife; and 
(e) No person shall be convicted unless by verdict of a jury, or upon a 
plea of guilty or no contest, or upon a judgment of a court when trial by 
jury has been waived or, in case of an infraction, upon a judgment by a 
magistrate. 
UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
Rule 17. The trial. 
(a) In all cases the defendant shall have the right to appear and defend in 
person and by counsel. The defendant shall be personally present at the trial 
with the following exceptions: 
(a)(1) In prosecutions of misdemeanors and infractions, defendant may 
consent in writing to trial in his absence; 
(a)(2) In prosecutions for offenses not punishable by death, the defendant's 
voluntary absence from the trial after notice to defendant of the time for trial 
shall not prevent the case from being tried and a verdict or judgment entered 
therein shall have the same effect as if defendant had been present; and 
(a)(3) The court may exclude or excuse a defendant from trial for good cause 
shown which may include tumultuous, riotous, or obstreperous conduct. 
Upon application of the prosecution, the court may require the personal 
attendance of the defendant at the trial. 
(b) Cases shall be set on the trial calendar to be tried in the following order: 
(b)(1) misdemeanor cases when defendant is in custody; 
(b)(2) felony cases when defendant is in custody; 
(b)(3) felony cases when defendant is on bail or recognizance; and 
(b)(4) misdemeanor cases when defendant is on bail or recognizance. 
(c) All felony cases shall be tried by jury unless the defendant waives a jury 
in open court with the approval of the court and the consent of the prosecution. 
(d) All other cases shall be tried without a jury unless the defendant makes 
written demand at least ten days prior to trial, or the court orders otherwise. 
No jury shall be allowed in the trial of an infraction. 
(e) In all cases, the number of members of a trial jury shall be as specified 
in Section 78-46-5, U.C.A. 1953. 
(f) In all cases the prosecution and defense may, with the consent of the 
accused and the approval of the court, by stipulation in writing or made orally 
in open court, proceed to trial or complete a trial then in progress with any 
number of jurors less than otherwise required. 
(g) After the jury has been impaneled and sworn, the trial shall proceed in 
the following order: 
(g)(1) The charge shall be read and the plea of the defendant stated; 
(g)(2) The prosecuting attorney may make an opening statement and the 
defense may make an opening statement or reserve it until the prosecution has 
rested; 
(g)(3) The prosecution shall offer evidence in support of the charge; 
(g)(4) When the prosecution has rested, the defense may present its case; 
(g)(5) Thereafter, the parties may offer only rebutting evidence unless the 
court, for good cause, otherwise permits; 
(g)(6) When the evidence is concluded and at any other appropriate time, 
the court shall instruct the jury; and 
(g)(7) Unless the cause is submitted to the jury on either side or on both 
sides without argument, the prosecution shall open the argument, the defense 
shall followT and the prosecution may close by responding to the defense 
argument. The court may set reasonable limits upon the argument of counsel 
for each party and the time to be allowed for argument. 
(h) If a juror becomes ill, disabled or disqualified during trial and an 
alternate juror has been selected, the case shall proceed using the alternate 
juror. If no alternate has been selected, the parties may stipulate to proceed 
with the number of jurors remaining. Otherwise, the jury shall be discharged 
and a new trial ordered. 
(i) Questions by jurors. A judge may invite jurors to submit written ques-
tions to a witness as provided in this section. 
(i)(l) If the judge permits jurors to submit questions, the judge shall control 
the process to ensure the jury maintains its role as the impartial finder of fact 
and does not become an investigative body. The judge may disallow any 
question from a juror and may discontinue questions from jurors at any time. 
(i)(2) If the judge permits jurors to submit questions, the judge should 
advise the jurors that they may write the question as it occurs to them and 
submit the question to the bailiff for transmittal to the judge. The judge should 
advise the jurors that some questions might not be allowed. 
(i)(3) The judge shall review the question with counsel and unrepresented 
parties and rule upon any objection to the question. The judge may disallow a 
question even though no objection is made. The judge shall preserve the 
written question in the court file. If the question is allowed, the judge shall ask 
the question or permit counsel or an unrepresented party to ask it. The 
question may be rephrased into proper form. The judge shall allow counsel and 
unrepresented parties to examine the witness after the juror's question. 
(j) When in the opinion of the court it is proper for the jury to view the place 
in which the offense is alleged to have been committed, or in which any other 
material fact occurred, it may order them to be conducted in a body under the 
charge of an officer to the place, which shall be shown to them by some person 
appointed by the court for that purpose. The officer shall be sworn that while 
the jury are thus conducted, he will suffer no person other than the person so 
appointed to speak to them nor to do so himself on any subject connected with 
the trial and to return them into court without unnecessary delay or at a 
specified time. 
(k) At each recess of the court, whether the jurors are permitted to separate 
or are sequestered, they shall be admonished by the court that it is their duty 
not to converse among themselves or to converse with, or suffer themselves to 
be addressed by, any other person on any subject of the trial, and that it is their 
duty not to form or express an opinion thereon until the case is finally 
submitted to them. 
(1) Upon retiring for deliberation, the jury may take with them the instruc-
tions of the court and all exhibits which have been received as evidence, except 
exhibits that should not, in the opinion of the court, be in the possession of the 
jury, such as exhibits of unusual size, weapons or contraband. The court shall 
permit the jury to view exhibits upon request. Jurors are entitled to take notes 
during the trial and to have those notes with them during deliberations. As 
necessary, the court shall provide jurors with writing materials and instruct 
the jury on taking and using notes. 
(m) When the case is finally submitted to the jury, they shall be kept 
together in some convenient place under charge of an officer until they agree 
upon a verdict or are discharged, unless otherwise ordered by the court. Except 
by order of the court, the officer having them under his charge shall not allow 
any communication to be made to them, or make any himself, except to ask 
them if they have agreed upon their verdict, and he shall not, before the verdict 
is rendered, communicate to any person the state of their deliberations or the 
verdict agreed upon. 
(n) After the jury has retired for deliberation, if they desire to be informed 
on any point of law arising in the cause, they shall inform the officer in charge 
of them, who shall communicate such request to the court. The court may then 
direct that the jury be brought before the court where, in the presence of the 
defendant and both counsel, the court shall respond to the inquiry or advise the 
jury that no further instructions shall be given. Such response shall be 
recorded. The court may in its discretion respond to the inquiry in writing 
without having the jury brought before the court, in which case the inquiry and 
the response thereto shall be entered in the record. 
(o) If the verdict rendered by a jury is incorrect on its face, it may be 
corrected by the jury under the advice of the court, or the jury may be sent out 
again. 
(p) At the conclusion of the evidence by the prosecution, or at the conclusion 
of all the evidence, the court may issue an order dismissing any information or 
indictment, or any count thereof, upon the ground that the evidence is not 
legally sufficient to establish the offense charged therein or any lesser included 
offense. 
(Amended effective November 1, 2001; November 1, 2002.) 
Rule 20. Exceptions unnecessary. 
Exceptions to rulings or orders of the court are unnecessary. It is sufficient 
that a party state his objections to the actions of the court and the reasons 
therefor. If a party has no opportunity to object to a ruling or order, the absence 
of an objection shall not thereafter prejudice him. 
Rule 30. Errors and defects. 
(a) Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect the 
substantial rights of a party shall be disregarded. 
(b) Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the record and 
errors in the record arising from oversight or omission may be corrected by the 
court at any time and after such notice, if any, as the court may order. 
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
ARTICLE I 
Sec, 12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and 
defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the 
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to 
be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to 
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public 
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is 
alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no 
instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to 
advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused 
shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be 
compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor 
shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
coNsnnmoN OF THE UNITED STATES 
AMENDMENT VI 
[Rights of accused.] 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy 
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the 
crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously 
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusa-
tion; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory 
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of 
counsel for his defence. 
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IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, I 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF 
Plaintiff, LAW, AND ORDER OF CONVICTION 
-vs-
Case No. 99191*407FS and 991915044FS 
REHAN HASSAN, 
Hon. Anne M. Stirba 
Defendant. 
On May 15, 2000, this matter came before this Court for trial. The State was represented 
by Paul B. Parker, Deputy Salt Lake District Attorney. Defendant was present and represented 
by Edward R. Montgomery. The State called as witnesses Carol Miller, J.D. Miller, Kathy 
Harris, Officer Bruce Evans and Detective Brad Burmingham. The Defendant testified and also 
called as a witness Abdou Bah. Photographs of the door of the Miller's apartment were admitted 
into evidence. Following the evidence both sides presented closing arguments. 
Having listened to the witnesses and having admitted the evidence and after having 
considered the arguments, this court makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On May 29, 1999, J.D. and Carol Miller lived in an apartment located at 550 East 
300 South #1, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
2. Defendant lived in the same apartment building directly across the hall from the 
Millers in apartment #2. 
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3. The Millers were hired to assist in taking care of the apartment building. They 
received a reduction in the amount of their rent for their services. 
4. Sometime prior to the 29th, the electrical power to defendant's apartment was shut 
off by the power company. 
5. To get power inside his apartment, defendant ran an electrical cord from his 
apartment out into the common areas of the building and plugged the cord into a 
electrical outlet. 
6. The power for the outlets in the common area of the apartment building was paid 
for by the building owners and defendant did not have permisson to use the power 
for his own apartment. 
7. On the 29th of May, the Millers found the electrical cord from defendant's 
apartment and J.D. unplugged it. 
8. Defendant became upset when he found the cord unplugged. 
9. Around 8:30 p.m., defendant went to the Millers' apartment door and confronted 
Carol about the cord. 
10. Carol did not let defendant inside but rather left him standing in the hall outside 
the door. 
11. A verbal argument followed and eventually Carol shut the door. 
12. Defendant became upset and kicked at the outside of the door several times until 
the door flew open. 
13. Defendant entered the apartment with the intent to assault Carol and/or J.D. 
14. Defendant told Carol that he was going to kill her and J.D. and then he grabbed 
Carol by the arm and threw her to the floor. 
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15. Defendant's actions in grabbing Carol and throwing her to the floor caused Carol 
pain and caused a small bruise on her arm. 
16. Defendant left the apartment. 
17. The Miller's closed the door and tried to secure it. 
18. About ten minutes later, Defendant again broke through the Miller's apartment 
door. 
19. Defendant entered with the intent to assault Carol and/or J.D. 
20. Defendant went to one of the bedrooms where Carol Miller was dressing. 
21. Defendant again threatened to kill Carol. Defendant also grabbed Carol and 
pushed her to the floor. 
22. Defendant then went to J.D. and hit him in the face and grabbed his hair. 
23. One of J.D.'s teeth was broken by the blow. 
24. Defendant then left. 
25. Defendant returned a third time. 
26. This Court cannot say beyond a reasonable doubt that he had a gun as he entered 
the apartment that third time. 
27. On June 3,1999, Kathy Harris was working with her son outside the apartment 
building at 550 East 300 South. 
28. Kathy is the wife of Ed Harris. Ed is the manager of the apartment building. 
29. Kathy assists her husband in managing the building. 
30. Carol approached Kathy and told her that defendant had plugged another power 
cord into the common area outlets. 
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31. Kathy approached defendant's front door and saw an extension cord running 
across the hall connecting defendant's apartment with a common outlet in the 
hallway. 
32. Kathy knocked on defendant's door. 
33. Defendant answered the door. Kathy explained that she was Ed Harris' wife and 
that defendant could not use the apartment building's power in his own apartment. 
34. Defendant knew that Ed Harris was the apartment manager. 
35. Kathy did not enter or attempt to enter defendant's apartment. 
36. Kathy did reach down to unplug the power cord from the hallway outlet. 
37. Defendant immediately hit Kathy in the mouth, shoved her against the wall across 
the hall and began to kick her repeatedly. 
38. Defendant's blows caused Kathy pain and soreness. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The elements of the crime of Burglary are: entering or remaining unlawfully in a 
building with the intent to commit an assault. 
2. The elements of the crime of Assault are: an act committed with unlawful force or 
violence that causes or creates a substantial risk of bodily injury to another. 
3. The elements of the crime of Aggravated Burglary are: in attempting, committing, 
or fleeing from a burglary the actor causes bodily injury to any person not a 
participant in the crime or uses or threatens the immediate use of a dangerous 
weapon against any person who is not a participant in the crime or possesses or 
attempts to use a dangerous weapon. 
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4. A dangerous weapon is defined as any item capable of causing death or serious 
bodily injury; or a facsimile or representation of the item; and the actor's use or 
apparent intended use of the items leads the victim to reasonably believe the items 
is likely to cause death or serious bodily injury or the actor represents to the 
victim verbally or in any other manner that he is in control of such an item. 
5. Bodily injury means physical pain, illness, or any impairment of physical 
condition. 
6. Serious bodily injury means bodily injury that creates or causes serious permanent 
disfigurement, protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily 
member or organ, or creates a substantial risk of death. 
7. Defendant's first entry into the Miller's apartment with the intent to commit an 
assault on the Millers meets the elements of Burglary. 
8. Defendant's acts of grabbing Carol Miller and throwing her to the floor caused 
bodiliy injury to Carol Miller and meets the elements for Assault as charged in 
count IV of case 991911407. 
9. Defendant's acts that caused bodily injury to Carol Miller occurred while 
defendant was in the commission of burglary of the Millers' apartment, therefore 
the elements have been met of Aggravated Burglary as charged in count number 
II of case 991911407. 
10. Defendant's second entry into the Miller's apartment with the intent to commit an 
assault on the Millers also meets the elements of Burglary. 
11. Defendant's acts during the second entry of hitting J.D. Miller in the face and 
pulling his hair caused bodily injury to J.D. Miller and meets the elements for 
Assault as charged in count V of case 991911407. 
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12. Defendant's acts causing bodily injury to J.D. Miller occurred during defendant's 
commission of burglary of the Millers' apartment and therefore meets the 
elements of Aggravated Burglary as charged in count number I of case number 
991915044. 
13. Defendant's acts hitting Kathy Harris in the mouth and kicking her caused bodily 
injury to her and therefore meets the elements of Assault as charged in count III 
ofcase 991911407. 
14. Defendant's entering the third and final time does not meet the element of 
Aggravated Burglary as charged in count I of case 991911407. 
ORDER 
Having made the above findings of fact and conclusion of law, IT IS THEREFORE 
ADJUDGED AND ORDERED that defendant is guilty of counts II, III, IV, V of case 
991911407 and of count I of 991915044. IT IS ALSO ADJUDGED AND ORDERED 
that defendant is not guilty of count I of 991911407. 
•71 " 
DATED this 26th day ofMay, 2000. 
Approved as to form: 
BY THE COURT 
ANNE M. STIRBA, District Judge 
Edward R. Montgomery 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Findings Of Fact, 
Conclusions Of Law, And Order Of Conviction was deliyered-^o Edward R. Montgomery, 
^Sal t Lake City, Utah 
84101 on the ^9~ day ofM«yr2000. 
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Case No. 991911407FS, 991915044FS 
Hon. Michael K. Burton 
This matter came before this court for hearing on defendant's motion for a new trial on 
August 16, 2002 and continued on September 17, 2002. Defendant was present Pro se, having 
waived appointed counsel. Paul B. Parker, Deputy Salt Lake District Attorney, represented the 
State. A motion for a new trial with memoranda had been submitted in defendant's behalf by 
earlier defense counsel. The State also submitted memoranda. Witnesses were called and 
testified. Both parties argued the matter fully. 
Having listened to the witnesses and having considered the written and oral arguments of 
both parties, this court makes the following findings of fact, conclusions of law and order: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Defendant was charged with multiple counts of Aggravated Burglary and 
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2. All the counts were alleged to have occurred at the same location. The 
majority of the counts alleged the same two victims, J.D. and Carol Miller 
and occurred on May 29, 1999. The Millers alleged that defendant had 
kicked open the door to their apartment and had entered three times 
assaulting and threatening them. During one of these entries, defendant 
had threatened the Millers with what looked like a small handgun. Count 
number three an Assault, was alleged to have occurred on June 3, 1999 
with another victim, Kathy Harris. In that count, Kathy Harris alleged that 
she confronted defendant about a power cord he had plugged into the 
apartment building hall outlet. In response, defendant attacked her. 
3. After separate preliminary hearings, the two informations were combined 
for trial and set before Judge Anne Stirba. 
4. Defendant sought legal assistance and, because of a conflict with the Salt 
Lake Legal Defender's, Office Edward Montgomery was appointed to 
represent defendant. 
5. Ed Montgomery investigated the allegations and defendant's alibi, talked 
with witnesses, reviewed police reports and hired an investigator. 
6. Prior to trial, Edward Montgomery filed a motion to sever count three, the 
Assault on Kathy Harris, from the other counts. 
7. After filing the motion, defendant waived the jury trial. 
8. Defendant talked with Mr. Montgomery and defendant's wife about the 
waiver. Defendant and Mr. Montgomery discussed the difficulties and 
benefits of a bench trial as compared to a jury trial. Defendant decided 
that Judge Stirba would be more favorable to defendant rather than a jury 
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that would not likely be able to relate to defendant's background and 
beliefs. 
9. Ed Montgomery testified that he withdrew the motion to severe because it 
would not have made any difference since the judge who would be hearing 
the case knew the facts. (In spite of Mr. Montgomery's testimony, the 
court docket indicates that Judge Stirba heard but denied the motion.) 
10. The day of the assault on Kathy Harris, police were called and took 
defendant into custody at the scene. Defendant was asked for 
identification. He stated that it was in his car but he could not say exactly 
where in the car it was located. Defendant eventually gave a police officer 
permission to enter the car to look for the identification. Once inside the 
car, while looking for the identification, the officer found and seized a gun 
shaped cigarette lighter. The lighter matched the description of the gun 
the Millers stated that defendant had threatened them with. 
11. Mr. Montgomery did not file a motion to suppress the seizure of a gun 
shaped cigarette lighter from defendant's car. 
12. The bench trial was held on May 15, 2000. 
13. During the trial, Mr. Montgomery cross-examined at length both of the 
Millers about the inconsistencies in their testimonies, the unusual points of 
their testimonies, and he cross-examined Ms. Miller about her past 
conviction for Aggravated Assault against her husband. Mr. Montgomery 
also cross-examined Mr. Miller about the damage to the door and his 
attempts to repair the door. Mr. Montgomery cross-examined Detective 
Brad Burmingham about his failure to find a girl named "Malena," and 
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whether the door could have actually had been damaged so little as it was 
if it had been locked as the Millers described. 
14. Defendant wanted to present the testimony of some locksmiths who would 
have testified that the door would have been damaged more if the door had 
been kicked in. 
15. Mr. Montgomery refused to present the witnesses because he had 
previously checked with another expert who had said the damage was 
consistent with the Miller's description. In light of that, Mr. Montgomery 
chose, rather than a battle of conflicting experts, to cross-examine and 
impeach the police witness and Mr. Miller on the damage. 
16. Mr. Montgomery also refused to introduce the testimony of some 
character witnesses that would have testified about defendant's good 
character. Defendant had a record of past assaults. Mr. Montgomery did 
not want to open the door to defendant's past assaults by introducing 
evidence of defendant's good character. 
17. Defendant took the stand at the trial and testified that he had been using 
power from the apartment hallway outlets since his own power had been 
shut off. He admitted arguing with Carol Miller at her door about her 
unplugging or cutting his power cords. He also admitted arguing with 
Kathy Harris but said he had to push her out of his apartment. He denied 
entering the Miller's apartments, and assaulting them. He denied 
assaulting Kathy Harris. 
18. Following the evidence and the arguments, Judge Stirba found defendant 
guilty of two counts of Aggravated Burglary and three counts of Assault. 
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19. Defendant was sentenced to prison on July 18, 2000. 
20. After the proceedings, Mr. Montgomery interviewed Malena, without 
defendant and his wife present. He found that her testimony would not 
have helped defendant. Malena was also reluctant to testify since she was 
married at the time of the event and her testimony would expose her 
relationship with defendant. 
21. Malena's testimony, proffered in his motion, was that Malena was in the 
apartment with defendant. She saw defendant leave and heard an 
argument in the hallway in which a woman and defendant both spoke with 
raised voices. She did not go into the hall or see whether defendant 
entered the Miller's apartment. She did say that after defendant returned, 
he did not leave the apartment any more that evening. 
22. Defendant eventually fired Mr. Montgomery and then several other 
attorneys, one of whom filed the motion for a new trial. Before the motion 
was heard defendant waived further assistance of counsel and proceeded at 
the hearing on the motion, Pro se. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Defendant's decision to waive the jury was a clear and informed choice. 
Defendant had the advise of counsel. He made a choice among 
alternatives and his decision was not unreasonable. 
2. Ed Montgomery's concurrence in defendant's waive was a matter of trial 
strategy and not unreasonable. 
3. Ed Montgomery's decision to withdraw the motion to sever was sound 
trial strategy given the decision to waive the jury since Judge Stirba was 
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informed, by the informations and the motion, of all the counts and the 
allegations upon with the counts were based. 
4. There was not a legal basis to support a motion to suppress since 
defendant had consented to the search of his car for identification and the 
cigarette lighter that looked like a gun was found during that search. 
5. Ed Montgomery's decision not to send notice of experts and call experts 
about the damage to the door was a reasonable trial strategy given the fact 
that the experts were conflicting and the inconsistencies in the Miller's 
statements were such that he could choose to impeach their testimonies 
more effectively. 
6. Ed Montgomery's decision to not call witnesses about defendant's good 
character was sound trial strategy particularly because admission of good 
character in evidence would have allowed the State to introduce evidence 
of defendant's bad character. 
7. Ed Montgomery was not ineffective in his assistance of defendant at trial 
8. The testimonies of the locksmiths are not new and previously unavailable 
evidence because the statements were known and available before the 
trial. 
9. The testimony of Malena was not an "alibi" because she was not present 
during the argument and the assaults. Instead, her purported testimony, 
was merely cumulative of other evidence presented and therefore would 
not have changed the outcome of the trial. 
10. There are no grounds for granted defendant's motion for a new trial. 
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ORDER 
Based upon the preceding Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, IT IS 
ORDERED that defendant's motion for a new trial is DENIED. 
DATED this H"fh day of Qcjtotfer, 2002. 
BY THE COURT: 
L-L 
/ / ^ > 
£sW 
Approved as to form: 
MICHAEL K. BURTON, District J O d ^ , 
Rehan Hassan, Pro se 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Findings Of Fact, 
Conclusions Of Law And Order was delivered to Pro Se, Attorney for Defendant Rehan Hassan, 
at P.O. Box 250, Salt Lake City, Utah 84020 on the y ^ d a y of October, 2002. 
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Case No. 991911407 
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MOTION HEARING 
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Carlton Way, Registered Professional Reporter 
sever at that time. 
MR. MONTGOMERY: That does not work for me, Your 
Honor. 
THE COURT: It does not? Okay. 
Marci, do you have another time. 
THE CLERK: Friday the 28th at 8:30. 
THE COURT: All right. And do I have the Jury 
Instructions, voir dire and — 
MR. MONTGOMERY: We can provide them further. My 
client is willing to waive a jury trial, and the State is in 
concurrence with that. 
THE COURT: I see. All right. 
Mr. Hassan, if you would -- Ifd like to have you 
sworn in. Would you please raise your right hand? 
(Defendant sworn.) 
All right. Mr. Hassan, do you understand that as a 
criminal defendant in both of these trials you have the right 
to have a jury of eight people to decide the outcome of the 
case? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: And that if this were to be tried to the 
jury — and that that is a constitutional right that you have, 
All right. Do you understand that? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: That if this were to proceed to a trial 
Carlton Way, Registered Professional Reporter 
by jury, a verdict of guilty would require an unanimous 
verdict of all eight jurors; do you understand that? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. And I understand that you 
wish to waive your right to a jury trial? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Do you understand that means that you'd 
be giving up your right to a jury trial? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: And is that what you want to do, give up 
your right to a jury trial? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor, I do. I have 
some reasoning for that — 
THE COURT: Pardon me? 
THE DEFENDANT: I have some reasoning for making that 
decision. I have written something down. It!s difficult to 
me, but these things I have — 
THE COURT: Well, let me ask you this: I want to 
make sure that you understand what you are doing and that you 
are giving up your right to a jury trial knowingly and 
voluntarily and with full understanding of what you are giving 
up. I am not trying to talk you out of it or into it. Ifm 
just trying to make sure you understand what you are doing. 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: You talked about this decision to give up 
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your right to jury trial with counsel? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Is anyone pressuring you to give up your 
right? 
THE DEFENDANT: No, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Are you doing it of your own free will? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Do you have any questions about — do you 
understand that a jury doesn't hear the evidence in this case, 
that it is tried to me as a judge. 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: And that I will be the only person making 
the decision on the guilt or innocence; do you understand? 
THE DEFENDANT: Absolutely. 
THE COURT: And is that what you want to have happen? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. Any questions about it? 
THE DEFENDANT: Not any questions about this thing. 
THE COURT: All right. I'm focusing on the jury 
trial issue right now. Okay, I'm just focusing on that. 
You might have questions about other aspects of the 
trial, but if you have any questions about giving up the right 
to a jury trial, now is the time to ask me. 
THE DEFENDANT: No, Your Honor, I don't. 
THE COURT: All right. Based on your testimony, I 
Carlton Way, Registered Professional Reporter 
find that you have knowingly, voluntarily and with full 
understanding of your rights given up your Constitutional 
rights to a jury trial, and the case will proceed to the Court 
beginning on May 1st, and I'll schedule three days for that. 
In lieu of that, then jury instructions are not 
needed. We will begin the trial at 9:30 in the morning. 
Are there any motions in limine? 
MR. MONTGOMERY: No, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. 
And Mr. Parker for the State, the State is also 
giving up its right to a trial by jury? 
MR. PARKER: We are, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. MONTGOMERY: I think we can — if it helps the 
Court at all, I don't think it is going to take three days. I 
think we can do it in two or perhaps less than that. 
THE COURT: All right. 
Well, I do want to talk about whether Mr. Hassan 
would feel comfortable with an interpreter. I know that he 
communicates very well in English, but given the pace of the 
trial does your client require an interpreter present? 
MR. MONTGOMERY: I donft think so. We've discussed 
it, and I donft think so. 
THE COURT: All right. 
Is there any other matter that we need to attend to 
Carlton Way, Registered Professional Reporter 
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1 Mr. Hassan, what I am going to do, at your request, 
2 is not hold this argument today. We will get the transcript, 
3 and I will review it. You will have a copy. You will get a 
4 copy of it, as well, of course. And we will set a time to come 
5 back and allow you to argue this motion. I am not going to 
6 appoint another attorney. I am not certain of who has been 
7 hired and who has been appointed. But you have had 
8 Mr. Grindstaff, and Mr. Montgomery, Ms. Corporon, Mr. Yengich, 
9 Ms. Buchi from LDA, and Mr. McCaughey. So I am not going to 
10 appoint another attorney. 
11 You indicate you want to argue it yourself. I want 
12 to talk to you about that a little bit, Mr. Hassan. I have 
13 allowed you to make this statement that you wanted to today. 
14 And I have no problem with that. But you need to understand a 
15 few things about the hearing we will have in the future. We 
16 will set the time in awhile. And that is that it will be an 
17 argument under the rule of law. With all due respect, this 
18 person you mentioned, whose case you are following, enemies of 
19 Islam, leaders of Pakistan, I don't, respectfully, care about 
20 those things. I am interested in whether, under the law, as I 
21 understand it, in the State of Utah, in the United States, you 
22 are entitled to a new trial. So when we come back, that's what 
23 I am going to restrict you to. 
24 Tell me a little about yourself. I understand you 
25 have a college degree and an MBA, is that correct, or Master of 
1 Public Administration? 
2 THE DEFENDANT: I have a Master's of Commerce from 
3 back home, and a Bachelor!s of Marketing. 
4 THE COURT: Do you have any experience with the legal 
5 system, at all, other than what you have been through in regard 
6 to this case? I know the history of this case, and so on. But 
7 other than this case, do you have any familiarity with the 
8 legal system? 
9 THE DEFENDANT: No, sir, I don't. 
10 THE COURT: Have you, since you have been, since last 
11 July, have you been studying the law in prison, at all? 
12 THE DEFENDANT: No, sir. 
13 THE COURT: Do you understand the Rules of Criminal 
14 Procedure, what is required to demonstrate and what is required 
15 for you to show, to justify a new trial? 
16 THE DEFENDANT: I believe I can follow some 
17 guidelines of the motion of new trial which was filed by Mary 
18 Corporon, though she did not mention all the facts in that. I 
19 believe that I have seen what Mr. Parker's arguments is, and I 
20 can very well cover them by reasoning. The only reason I have 
21 to take charge of this case myself is that I donft have a 
22 Muslim representation. Unless I am entitled to get a Muslim 
23 representation or counsel from outside the state, from Los 
24 Angeles or something, which I donft know, I don't trust the 
25 legal system over here. 
THE COURT: You are certainly entitled to hire any 
attorney you want to represent you. But I am not going to 
appoint anyone else, simply given the history of this case. 
Mr. Hassan, you need to understand that, in my opinion, it is a 
mistake for you to represent yourself at even this type of 
hearing. It is fairly restricted. The things I am going to 
consider are fairly restricted. I am simply going to consider 
if there are proper grounds that justify a new trial. Many of 
the things you have mentioned today, I have seen in writings 
that you have provided to the Court, and that Ms. Updike, at 
least they are signed by Elizabeth Updike, have provided to the 
Court, the case history and so on. Many of the things you have 
said, I have seen in some form or close to that form. Most of 
those, Mr. Hassan, will not be considered in this argument. So 
I think it is a mistake for you to pursue it yourself. But you 
are certainly entitled to represent yourself, and the Court and 
our legal system can't force an attorney upon you. But you 
should only do that and I will only allow it if I am convinced 
that you are able to do that. 
Now, it is obvious to me, not only from just your 
education, but from seeing the history of this case and seeing 
you here today, and hearing you, that you are an intelligent 
person. But I donf t know that you have a full grasp of what 
Rule 24 is of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, which is 
the rule that dictates what is required to be shown to justify 
«i n 
1 a new trial. 
2 But, Mr. Parker, anything else that you think I ought 
3 to inquire about with Mr. Hassan? I understand there is that 
4 case State vs. Frampton. I havenft read it for some time. I 
5 should comply with in terms of allowing someone to represent 
6 J themselves. Any other suggestions? 
7 MR. PARKER: I also haven't read Frampton for awhile. 
8 I think the Court, basically, covered it. I understand 
9 Frampton required the Court to indicate the difficulty, of some 
10 of the problems, make a strong recommendation that he do it, 
11 himself, consider his experience and his intelligence, and I 
12 think the Court has done all of that. I think it is sufficient 
13 to allow Mr. McCaughey to withdraw, and allow him to represent 
14 I himself. 
15 THE DEFENDANT: Your Honor, may I? 
16 THE COURT: Yes, go ahead. 
17 THE DEFENDANT: Considering what you told me, 
18 considering especially what you told me about getting a Muslim 
19 counsel, my understanding was — I don't have much knowledge of 
20 the legal system. It is extremely hard to get an attorney 
21 outside Los Angeles — outside Salt Lake or Utah. And I was 
22 trying to get an attorney from Los Angeles. I donf t want to 
23 waste the time of the Court, and I am in prison, anyway, if it 
24 is appropriate, I could be given like a month or so, and I can 
25 J make a final attempt with my parents and my consulate general 
and see if I can hire a Muslim counsel within a month or month 
and a half or something, if possible. If not, then I am 
willing to. 
THE COURT: Someone give me their best estimate, if 
Ms. Campbell has retired, when do you think a transcript can be 
available? Anyone? 
MR. PARKER: I would suggest we set it for a couple 
of months. I guess it was just a day. 
THE COURT: Then brought back the next day for the 
ruling. 
THE DEFENDANT: It was scheduled for two days, but it 
took only one day. 
THE COURT: I don't know if Ms. Campbell is still 
around. I am assuming she is. My experience, generally, is we 
could get that transcript and so on within 30 days or so, 
assuming she is around here. So what I am going to do, 
Mr. Hassan, is schedule a hearing about 60 days away from now. 
If you can hire your own attorney, you can give that attorney 
this date. If you canft or don't, then you be prepared to 
argue that, yourself. We will get that transcript to you as 
soon as it is available. I can't say when that is. I think 
everyone is at a bit of a disadvantage as far as knowing 
exactly when we can get that. But that would still be ample 
time for you to prepare for that. 
So I will find that Mr. McCaughey has a basis to 
19 
1 withdraw, and I will allow him to withdraw, I will find that, 
2 for the purposes of this argument, where there will not be 
3 evidence presented, where there will simply be argument, and 
4 I you were present at the trial and testified at the trial, that 
5 you, Mr. Hassan, are able to represent yourself at that 
6 hearing. And I will allow that. Believing, as I do, that you 
7 are capable of arguing and understanding Rule 24, basically 
8 have to show that an injustice was done at the trial. 
9 So I will allow you to represent yourself. I will 
10 ask Mr. McCaughey, before he leaves, to do whatever he can to 
11 file the necessary papers to order that transcript. And then 
12 he will be off the case. The transcript will come to you. 
13 THE DEFENDANT: Your Honor, just I want to apologize 
14 the heat which was coming, with all due respect, you know, I 
15 have nothing against someone in particular or something. But I 
16 do want to say that, for the heated argument, heated things 
17 which have been inside of me, what I said, but there is no 
18 offense, I donft want you to take any offense towards you or 
19 something, please. 
20 THE COURT: I don!t easily take offense, Mr. Hassan. 
21 But at the argument I will again expect you to confine yourself 
22 to those things that are relevant. But I am not going to cut 
23 you off, probably. Donft worry. Letfs get a date about 60 
24 days away. 



























IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAR^j^TY 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
-oOo-





Case No. 991915044 
Case No. 991911407 
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL 
(Videotape Proceedings) 
-oOo-
BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 16th day of 
August, 2002, commencing at the hour of 10:55 a.m., the 
above-entitled matter came on for hearing before the 
HONORABLE MICHAEL K. BURTON, sitting as Judge in the 
above-named Court for the purpose of this cause, and that 
the following videotape proceedings were had. 
-oOo-
A P P E A R A N C E S 
For the State: 
For the Defendant: 
PAUL B. PARKER 
Deputy Salt Lake County 
District Attorney 
231 East 400 South, #300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
REHAN HASSAN 
Appearing Pro Se 
ORIHIMAI 
ALAN P SMITH, CSR 
385 BRAHMA DRIVE (801) 266-0320 
SALT LAKE CITY UTAH 84107 
him too seriously. 
MR. HASSAN: Yeah, you did not. 
THE COURT: No. 
MR. HASSAN: Considering where I am, you know... 
THE COURT: Well, that's kind of where I viewed it, 
yeah. 
MR. GARCIA: Well, I'm probably harder to get along 
with than you are. 
MR. HASSAN: Well, we'll have a good time then. 
Your Honor, like I said, right now, I—I feel 
desperately in the need of getting the proceeding, you know, 
the—done. I'm sorry Mr. Parker is not ready or something, 
'cause these are—we have set the date and I wrote you that 
letter, I—I—you know. 
THE COURT: Because you assumed I'd read it, I 
don't— 
MR. HASSAN: Well, you know what I am saying is that 
because it's a big situation. In order for him to get ready, 
it's going to take him three months more, I'm just ready. 
THE COURT: No question that Mr. Garcia will want to 
spend a little time on it. 
MR. HASSAN: Yes. 
THE COURT: So, do you want to—say you want to go 
on your own? I mean— 
MR. HASSAN: Yes, your Honor. 
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THE COURT: — I think you're clear enough minded, I 
know that you know the process well. Mr. Garcia would be 
happy to help you. 
It would take a little while. I mean, I think Mr. 
Garcia would be reluctant to say, yeah, let's go today, 
there's a lot at stake for you and then Mr. Garcia has a—a 
duty to do the very best he can. S o — 
MR. GARCIA: I have an obligation to be competent. 
THE COURT: Yeah. And so you can—he can't go ahead 
today and help you. I don't think he could ever take that 
position. 
MR. GARCIA: I know. That's what I'm saying. I 
would— 
THE COURT: So, in your mind, if today is the day, 
then you're probably going to have to say, I don't want Mr. 
Garcia's help, I'm going to go on my own. 
MR. HASSAN: Not at this point then, I 'don't want— 
I'm sorry, but I'm ready t o — 
MR. GARCIA: Nothing personal. 
THE COURT: Mr. Garcia is not going to take it 
personally. 
MR. GARCIA: May I be excused? 
THE COURT: You may. 
MR. GARCIA: Thank you. 
MR. PARKER: I do think, your Honor, if he's going 
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to go on his own, we need to go over what is—seems to be 
known as the Frampton inquiries and that is to check with him 
to see if he understands what he's doing and the results and 
consequences and his inexperience to be able to represent 
himself. 
THE COURT: Well, I kind of thought he—he had 
demonstrated that before, but I mean— 
MR. PARKER: I think we at least ought to go through 
the questions and inquire of him, whether or not the answer is 
obvious. 
THE COURT: All right. Well, let me try that, Mr. 
Hassan. 
You, at this juncture, you're clearly not able to 
hire an attorney, you can't go out and pay for one? 
MR. HASSAN: No. I can't. 
THE COURT: Okay. So, we know that's a fact, 'cause 
you've been in custody for like three years now. 
MR. HASSAN: Two-and-a-half. 
THE COURT: Two-and-a-half. All right. 
So, you'd be a person to whom we could appoint an 
attorney and you understand we'd do that if you wanted, the 
State would pay for your attorney. You've decided today, if I 
understood you right, you don't want the attorney's help. 
MR. HASSAN: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: And so, do you feel like you're 
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competent to go ahead and help yourself? 
MR. HASSAN: I'm pretty sure I'm competent. 
THE COURT: You understand that Mr. Parker is 
trained in the law and that he knows what's going on and in 
theory— 
MR. HASSAN: Yeah. And I — 
THE COURT: —I'm trained in the law and I'm 
supposed to know what's going on. 
MR. HASSAN: Yeah. 
THE COURT: And so you're the only one of the three 
of us i n — 
MR. HASSAN: I know I've got a — 
THE COURT: —theory— 
MR. HASSAN: —handicap or whatever, but I have been 
there, done that, I—I just don't want to have any more 
attorneys that won't do what I want and— 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. HASSAN: —just keep on going. 
THE COURT: Now, you obviously have other remedies 
besides this new trial. And I think you've talked about it, 
you want to appeal something,— 
MR. HASSAN: Uh huh. 
THE COURT: —which is fine, because you understand 
you've got to get this one out of the way first before you go 
that step; but you understand that if you go ahead and because 
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you aren't as experienced and able, you might be giving away 
opportunities or rights that other folks have? 
MR. HASSAN: Yeah. I—I'm aware of that, the—the— 
like I said, the only handicap which I'm having with not 
having attorneys is those—that those people are not 
subpoenaed, and but I have—I have those statements and stuff 
that what I will present, but otherwise, you know, they would 
have been subpoenaed. That's something which the Court should 
keep in mind, you know, that I don't have—you know, I tried 
everything to get those people subpoenaed. 
THE COURT: Well, but I mean, so that brings up a 
very good point. I mean, you're giving up the right to have 
folks come in and give testimony in your behalf, not in your 
personal behalf, but in behalf of a motion that you bring. 
And is that a wise thing for you to do? 
MR. HASSAN: Your Honor, I—I'm way sick and tired 
of the situation. I just do not have any more (inaudible) to 
be with attorneys, be it attorneys and—but they all make me 
look bad and I, you know, it just—whatever happens, it just— 
it's not—it's not that we (inaudible) different way or maybe 
I'm supposed to be representing whatever handicap I have, 
whatever I present, I'll present. I know that we're supposed 
to be (inaudible) and you know, it would be documented type 
stuff, you know, I—I assume. And I'm just saying I just want 
to bring all the (inaudible) I can bring and then from there 
13 
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